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Abstract
Efficiency and fairness are two desiderata in market design. Fairness requires ran-
domization in many environments. As one of the few successful matching mechanisms,
Top Trading Cycle is best known for being efficient to solve deterministic allocation
problems, but it is inadequate to incorporate randomization efficiently and fairly. We
propose a class of Fractional Top Trading Cycle mechanisms to solve allocation prob-
lems in which agents have fractional endowments or are ranked by coarse priorities.
Dropping the graph-based definition of Top Trading Cycle, we use parameterized linear
equations to describe how agents trade endowments or priorities. Our mechanisms are
ex-ante efficient. They satisfy various fairness axioms when parameter values in the
equations are properly chosen. We apply our mechanisms to a couple of market design
problems and obtain efficient and fair assignments in all of them.
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1 Introduction
The past decades have witnessed the rapid development of matching theory and its applica-
tions. Gale and Shapley’s (1962) Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Gale’s Top Trading Cycle
(TTC; Shapley and Scarf, 1974) are the two most important matching mechanisms. DA
is well known for finding stable allocations when both sides of a market have preferences
(sometimes taking the form of priorities) over their partners, while TTC is well known for
finding efficient allocations when resources on one side are to be allocated to agents on the
other side. Both mechanisms perform well in solving deterministic allocation problems, but
they become inadequate to solve random allocation problems. Fairness, when imposing a
symmetry requirement that “equals” be treated equally, is often achieved through randomiza-
tion because of indivisibility of resources.1 As Budish et al. (2013) put it, “Randomization
is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. It is used to break ties among students
applying for overdemanded public schools and for popular after-school programs, to ration
offices, parking spaces and tasks among employees, to allocate courses and dormitory rooms
amongst college students, and to assign jury and military duties among citizens. [...] Ran-
domization can restore symmetry, and thus a measure of fairness.” However, it is hard to
incorporate randomization into the procedures of DA and TTC without losing their flagship
properties. For example, in school choice with coarse priorities, DA with random tie-breaking
results in ex-ante discrimination among students of equal priority,2 while TTC with random
tie-breaking is no longer efficient from an ex-ante view.3 This paper solves the inadequacy of
TTC and propose generalizations to solve random allocation problems efficiently and fairly.
This restores the desirability of TTC and makes new applications possible.
The inadequacy of TTC is due to its procedure that has to take discrete endowments
(Shapley and Scarf, 1974) or strict priorities (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003) as inputs.
When agents co-own objects or are ranked by coarse priorities, we have to resort to random-
ized endowments or random tie breaking to restore symmetry. It is equivalent to randomizing
over TTC outcomes, but this randomization results in efficiency loss, and the fairness of the
1When agents are strictly ranked by priorities, we often use priority-based fairness notions (e.g., no
justified envy in school choice). But in the absence of strict priorities, which happens in many environments,
fairness takes the form of symmetry requirements.
2Observing this inadequacy, Kesten and U¨nver (2015) propose probabilistic versions of DA to find con-
strained efficient and ex-ante stable allocations. Yet the mechanisms have undesirable feature in computation.
3In the extreme case that all students have equal priorities at all schools, TTC with uniformly random
priorities is equivalent to the Random Priority mechanism (RP; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998), which
is shown by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) to be ex-ante inefficient.
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found assignment is not transparent.
We present our mechanisms in a direct extension of Shapley and Scarf’s housing market
model that we call fractional endowment exchange model (FEE). In the model agents co-own
objects and the fractions of objects owned by different agents can be different. The house
allocation model where random allocation has been studied since Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979) can be regarded as an FEE problem in which agents own equal divisions of all objects,
whereas the housing market model is a degenerate FEE problem. In applications we extend
our mechanisms to priority-based allocation problems.
To see the difficulty of solving FEE by TTC, suppose we mimic its procedure in discrete
allocation problems by letting agents point to favorite objects and objects point to owners
step by step, and clearing cycles at each step. When an object has several owners, to avoid
discrimination we let the object point to all of its owners. Then a problem arises: the cycles
generated at each step may not be disjoint and an agent may appear in several cycles. How
to clear intersecting cycles in an efficient and fair way is obscure. Moreover, even though the
cycles at a step are disjoint, clearing all of them can lead to unfair outcomes. We present
examples to illustrate these situations in Section 3.
To circumvent the above difficulty, we still let agents report favorite objects step by step,
but we give up the graph-based definition of TTC. We switch to use parameterized linear
equations to describe the essence of trading endowments at each step. The equations require
that agents trade endowments in a balanced way: At each step the amount of favorite object
obtained by each agent, which is an unknown in our equations, should be equal to the amount
of endowments lost by the agent. We use a set of parameters to control how the owners of
each object divide the right of using the object to trade with the others. For example, we
may require that at each step the owners of each object use equal amounts of the object to
trade with the others, or they use amounts proportional to their endowments to trade with
the others. The choices of these parameters are related to fairness. We use another set of
parameters to control the amount of endowments agents can trade at each step. By solving
the equations at each step, we know how agents trade endowments at the step. By choosing
different parameter values, we obtain different mechanisms. So we actually define a class of
mechanisms, and we call all of them Fractional Top Trading Cycle (FTTC).
In discrete allocation problems TTC is well-defined because cycles clearly exist at each
step. Our definition of FTTC is based on solving linear equations at each step. We prove
that the solution to the equations must exist. The proof relies on an observation that our
equations essentially describe an equilibrium that has been studied by the closed Leontief
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input-output model (Leontief, 1941). The model describes input-output relationships, char-
acterized by a set of linear equations, among finite industries in a simple economy. When
the economy reaches an equilibrium, every industry makes zero profit. This implies that
every column of the coefficient matrix of the input-output equations sums to one.4 Here,
balanced endowment trade also implies that every column of the coefficient matrix of our
equations sums to one. Based on existing (linear algebra) results on the Leontief model,
we prove our result. Interestingly, by connecting to the Leontief model we also obtain a
graph-based interpretation of FTTC. In the equilibrium of the Leontief model, industries
form autonomous sub-economies. Similarly, at each step of FTTC, if we generate a graph
by letting agents point to favorite objects and objects point to owners, we will see that
some agents and objects form disjoint parts in the graph that we call absorbing sets. The
agents in each absorbing set trade their endowments in the set among themselves, whereas
the agents and objects not in any absorbing set are not involved in any trade. Thus, FTTC
is a procedure of trading absorbing sets. This extends the usual description of TTC. In the
housing market model, absorbing sets reduce to cycles.
Efficiency and fairness are two desiderata in market design. FTTC can be efficient and fair
simultaneously. Every FTTC is individually rational and sd-efficient (Bogomolnaia and Moulin,
2001). That is, every agent regards his outcome from FTTC as weakly better than his en-
dowment in the first-order stochastic dominance sense, and no agent can be made better off
without harming the others. An FTTC satisfies various fairness axioms when its parame-
ters are properly chosen. We propose a fairness axiom called bounded envy, which imposes
fairness among any two agents. It requires that if an agent is envied by another agent, the
envy should be bounded by the former agent’s advantage in endowments. For agents of equal
endowments, it implies no envy among them. We present different conditions on parameters
in FTTC to ensure equal treatment of equals, equal-endowment no envy, or bounded envy.
As examples, we present three different FTTC that satisfy bounded envy. We relate the
fairness motivations behind them to three classical solution rules in the bankruptcy problem
(O’Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985; Thomson, 2003, 2015).
In random allocation problems there is an inherent conflict between efficiency, fair-
ness, and strategy-proofness (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). More severely, in the FEE
model there is a conflict between individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness
(Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011; Aziz, 2018). So every FTTC is not strategy-proof.
Motivated by the literature (e.g., Che and Kojima, 2010), we consider large markets and
4In linear algebra, such matrix is called stochastic.
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prove that a subset of FTTC is asymptotically strategy-proof as market size increases and
agents’ preferences diversify. We also examine the core notion in the FEE model. It is known
that TTC finds the unique core allocation in the housing market model. With ordinal prefer-
ences, there are more than one ways to define the core notion in the FEE model. We propose
a reasonable core notion, and prove that the core can be empty, but the associated weak core
is always nonempty. There always exists a weak core assignment that treats equals equally,
but sometimes all weak core assignments violate equal-endowment no envy.
This paper contributes to matching theory and its applications. We add new mechanisms
to market designers’ toolkit. They provide new solutions to existing applications and make
new applications possible. As examples, we present four applications. We first apply FTTC
to school choice with coarse priorities. Although coarse priorities are widely used in practice,
strict priorities are commonly assumed by many theory papers. As well recognized by the
literature, any preference-independent tie breaking rule is inefficient. Our FTTC does not
explicitly break priority ties. At each step, we endow the students of equal highest priority
at each school with equal rights of using the school’s seats to trade with the others. The
found assignment is efficient and fair. This solution generalizes Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003) who first apply TTC to school choice by assuming strict priorities.
In the second application we study time exchange markets. Agents in such markets
exchange time and skills through serving each other without paying each other. A prominent
example is various form of time banks that exist in many countries.5 Such markets can be
modeled as an FEE problem in which objects are services and endowments are time units of
services that agents can provide. FTTC can be straightforwardly used to find efficient and
fair assignments. Depending on fairness criteria, different FTTC can be used.
In the third application we study the allocation of agents to institutions under (geograph-
ically) distributional constraints, as studied by Kamada and Kojima (2015) in the context
of Japanese medical residency match. A floor (or ceiling) constraint restricts the minimum
(or maximum) number of agents assigned to a group of institutions. The literature has
demonstrated the difficulty of dealing with floor constraints. We develop an efficient and fair
method to deal with both ceiling and floor constraints. By assuming institutions prefer to
hire more agents when constraints are not violated, we first generate an assignment in which
agents have equal access to all institutions and the numbers of agents assigned to institutions
cannot be Pareto improved. We then treat this assignment as initial endowment, and run
a fair FTTC. The found assignment satisfies all constraints, ensures no envy among agents,
5See Andersson et al. (2019) for more description of real-life time banks.
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and is Pareto efficient when the preferences of both sides are taken into account.
In the last application we study the house allocation model, which we regard as a special
case of the FEE model. It turns out that every FTTC coincides with a simultaneous eating
algorithm defined by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), and every fair FTTC that treats
agents of equal endowments equally coincides with Probabilistic Serial (PS).6 In an eating
algorithm agents consume probability shares of favorite objects in the unit time interval
with perhaps unequal rates. Agents have equal rates in PS. In FTTC, agents also consume
favorite objects step by step, but they have endowments and trade endowments in balanced
way at each step. In this sense, FTTC generalizes the idea of eating algorithms. When
some agents have private endowments, the model becomes house allocation with existing
tenants (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999). By describing the endowment structure by
coarse priorities, our extension of FTTC to school choice in the first application becomes an
appealing solution to the model. The solution can be described as an extension of PS that
incorporates the feature of TTC. Specifically, at any time in the unit interval, if a group of
existing tenants form a cycle, they trade fractional endowments instantly; otherwise, agents
consume favorite objects with rates satisfying a rule called “you request my house - I get
your rate”.7
The closest paper to ours in methodology is Leshno and Lo (2018). To understand the
role of strict priorities in TTC when applying it to school choice, they consider a setting
with finite schools and a continuum of students. Because of measurability issue, directly
translating TTC to their setting by considering individual cycles is difficult. So they define
a continuous-time TTC by using trade balance equations to characterize aggregate trading
behavior over multiple steps. Our two papers have the following differences. First, they
follow the theory literature by assuming strict priorities. Their difficulty is solely caused by
the technical continuum setting. We consider finite agents and finite objects. Our difficulty
is caused by fractional endowments or coarse priorities, both appearing in real-life allocation
problems. Second, their mechanism is an alternative definition of TTC, whereas our mecha-
nisms are new and can solve applications that TTC cannot solve. Third, we add parameters
to our equations to control fairness, which have no parallels in their equations.
After discussing more related literature in the rest of this section, we organize the paper
6Every FTTC satisfies the fairness axiom equal-division lower bound because we regard equal divisions
of objects as agents’ endowments. The coincidence between fair FTTC and PS transparently clarifies the
connection between PS and TTC, which is first found by Kesten (2009).
7This mechanism converges to the “you request my house - I get your turn” mechanism
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999) in large markets as PS converges to RP (Che and Kojima, 2010).
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as follows. Section 2 presents the FEE model. Section 3 presents two examples to illustrate
the difficulty of solving FEE through clearing cycles. Section 4 defines FTTC. Section 5
relates FTTC to the Leontief model and defines absorbing sets. Section 6 presents efficiency
and fairness properties, and Section 7 presents three fair FTTC. Section 8 presents the core
and incentive properties. Section 9 presents applications. Section 10 concludes. Appendix
contains proofs and more results. Online Appendix contains omitted results.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is closely related to the random allocation literature in market design. The litera-
ture has centered around two efficient and fair random allocation mechanisms: Hylland and Zeckhauser’s
(1979) Pseudo-market mechanism and Bogomolnaia and Moulin’s (2001) PS. Both mecha-
nisms are proposed in the house allocation model and then generalized to various environ-
ments by follow-up studies. The former mechanism requires cardinal utilities and seeks a
competitive equilibrium allocation, while the latter, as other matching mechanisms, requires
only ordinal preferences and has an algorithmic definition. We briefly discuss the related
literature that develops the two mechanisms and compare it with this paper.
Yılmaz (2010) extends PS to the house allocation with existing tenants model. His idea is
to minimally deviate from equal eating rate in PS without violating IR constraints of existing
tenants. If an existing tenant least prefers his endowment, his ownership is essentially ignored
in the mechanism. His mechanism satisfies a fairness axiom called no justified envy (NJE).
Differently, in our application of FTTC to the model, agents essentially trade ownerships
implied by the endowment structure. An existing tenant benefits from his endowment if the
other agents prefer his endowment.
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011) extend Yilmaz’s mechanism to the FEE model.
So their mechanism is not an extension of TTC. It satisfies NJE but violates equal-endowment
no envy (EENE). As they said, EENE is natural because “two agents with identical en-
dowments bring exactly the same resources to the group, so any differences in their final
assignment should be explained solely by their preferences.” They wonder the existence of a
mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, individual rationality and EENE, and regard a general-
ization of TTC to the model as a challenging question. This paper answers both questions.
Budish et al. (2013) characterize the constraint structure that preserves the Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem, which is crucial for the implementation of random assignments. They
generalize the above two mechanisms to accommodate various types of constraints. In our
applications we use FTTC to solve geographically distributional constraints. How to use
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FTTC to solve more general constraints is an interesting direction for future research.
Echenique et al. (2019a) generalize Pseudo-market to solve any constraint structure char-
acterized by a well-defined set of feasible assignments. Key is the idea of pricing constraints.
Echenique et al. (2019b) extend NJE to a more general environment and use Pseudo-market
with price-dependent incomes to find desirable allocations. Both papers assume cardinal
utilities, so their methodology is different from ours.
In an unpublished paper Aziz (2015) makes an attempt to generalize TTC to the FEE
model. To solve the difficulty as we illustrate in Section 3, he uses exogenous rankings of
agents and objects to prioritize cycles. That is, he essentially selects a subset of cycles to
trade at each step. This makes his mechanism unfair. In Online Appendix we define his
mechanism by describing it as an FTTC, and explain that the mechanism does not treat equal
agents equally. Similarly, Altuntas and Phan (2017) assume that objects use strict priorities
to rank agents, and straightforwardly generalize TTC. Priorities introduce asymmetry and
thus cause artificial unfairness.
Many papers are related to our applications, but we only discuss the most related here.
In the school choice model with coarse priorities, Kesten and U¨nver (2015) propose two ex-
ante stability notions as well as two probabilistic versions of DA to find constrained efficient
and ex-ante stable allocations. He et al. (2018) generalize Pseudo-market to the same model.
By using priority-dependent prices, their mechanism finds ex-ante stable allocations defined
by Kesten and U¨nver (2015). Following Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), we do not take
stability as a desideratum in our extension of TTC.
Andersson et al. (2019) and Manjunath and Westkamp (2019) propose two different time
exchange models. In the former model each agent provides a distinct service and has di-
chotomous preferences over services in the market. In the latter model agents are endowed
with disjoint sets of shifts and have dichotomous preferences over the other agents’ shifts.
Both papers recommend priority mechanisms. Fairness is not their concern. Differently, in
our model an agent can provide several services and several agents can provide the same
service. Our mechanism lets agents trade services step by step, and finds fair assignments.
In the Japanese medical residency match model, Kamada and Kojima (2015) consider
ceiling constraints and adapt DA to solve the model. Their mechanism satisfies a priority-
based fairness notion. Akin (2019) follows their approach and generalizes their fairness
notion to accommodate floor constraints. Kamada and Kojima (2018) relax their fairness
notion but find that absence of floor constraints is still crucial for the existence of desirable
matchings. When transfers are allowed, Kojima et al. (2019) find that only ceiling and floor
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constraints on capacities of hospitals preserve the gross substitutes property of their demands
and guarantee the existence of competitive equilibrium. Our method can solve both ceiling
and floor constraints. By using random allocation, our method abandons priorities and treats
doctors equally.
TTC has been intensively studied in deterministic allocation environments. A related
paper is Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) that uses the notion of absorbing sets to deal with
weak preferences in TTC (see Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) for a similar solution). By
identifying absorbing sets at each step, they determine when it is safe to remove a group of
agents and their assignments without losing efficiency. Different than them, we use absorbing
sets to provide a description of FTTC that resembles the familiar definition of TTC. To run
FTTC, we do not need to identify absorbing sets at each step.
TTC has been extended by Pa´pai (2000), Pycia and U¨nver (2017), Morrill (2015), and
Hakimov and Kesten (2018), among others. TTC has been applied to school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
2003), house allocation (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999), kidney exchange (Roth et al.,
2004), and tuition and worker exchange (Dur and U¨nver, 2019). TTC has been characterized
by Ma (1994), Morrill (2013), Dur (2013), Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018), Dur and Morrill
(2018), and Abdulkadirogˇlu et al. (2017).
2 Setup
A fractional endowment exchange (FEE) problem is a four-tuple (I, O,≻I , ω) in which
• I is a finite set of agents;
• O is a finite set of objects;
• ≻I= {≻i}i∈I is the preference profile of agents;
• ω = (ωi,o)i∈I,o∈O is the endowment matrix.
For each agent i, ωi = (ωi,o)o∈O denotes i’s endowments, with ωi,o ∈ [0, 1] being the amount
(probability share) of object o owned by i. We require
∑
o∈O ωi,o ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I. Let
qo =
∑
i∈I ωi,o denote the total amount of object o, which is an integer. In most applications
objects are indivisible and every agent demands one object. But our model and mechanisms
can apply without change to environments in which objects are divisible. Our application
to time exchange markets is an example.8 Each i has a strict preference relation ≻i, which
8When each object represents a service type, if one unit of a service means one day or one hour, then a
half of the service means a half day or a half hour.
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is a linear order on O, with %i being the at least as good as relation; that is, o %i o
′ if and
only if o ≻i o
′ or o = o′. The FEE model reduces to the housing market model if |I| = |O|
and ω is a permutation matrix.
A lottery is a vector l ∈ ℜ
|O|
+ such that
∑
o∈O lo ≤ 1. A lottery l weakly (first-order)
stochastically dominates another lottery l′ for agent i, denoted by l %sdi l
′, if
∑
o′%io
lo′ ≥∑
o′%io
l′o′ for all o ∈ O. If the inequality is strict for some o, l strictly stochastically dominates
l′ for agent i, denoted by l ≻sdi l
′.
An assignment is a matrix p = (pi,o)i∈I,o∈O ∈ ℜ
|I|×|O|
+ such that
∑
i∈I pi,o ≤
∑
i∈I ωi,o for
all o ∈ O and
∑
o∈O pi,o ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I. Each pi,o is the amount of o assigned to i. The row
vector pi = (pi,o)o∈O is the lottery assigned to i. When objects are indivisible, if all elements of
p are integers, then p is a deterministic assignment. The Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem and
its generalization (Birkhoff, 1946; Von Neumann, 1953; Kojima and Manea, 2010) guarantee
that every assignment is a convex combination of deterministic assignments. An assignment
p strictly stochastically dominates another assignment p′, denoted by p ≻sdI p
′, if pi %
sd
i p
′
i
for all agent i and pj ≻
sd
j p
′
j for some agent j. An assignment p is sd-efficient if it is never
strictly stochastically dominated. It is individually rational (IR) if pi %
sd
i ωi for all i ∈ I. IR
implies that
∑
o∈O pi,o =
∑
o∈O ωi,o for all i.
An assignment p satisfies equal treatment of equals (ETE) if for all i, j ∈ I such that
ωi = ωj and ≻i=≻j , pi = pj ; p satisfies equal-endowment no envy (EENE) if for all i, j ∈ I
such that ωi = ωj , pi %
sd
i pj and pj %
sd
j pi. EENE is stronger than ETE.
We denote an FEE problem by its preference profile when its other elements are fixed.
Let P denote the set of all linear orders on O. A mechanism ϕ finds an assignment ϕ(≻I) for
each ≻I∈ P
|I|. The lottery assigned to each i in ϕ(≻I) is denoted by ϕi(≻I). A mechanism
satisfies an efficiency or fairness axiom if its found assignments satisfy the axiom.
An agent i weakly manipulates a mechanism ϕ at ≻I by reporting ≻
′
i∈ P\{≻i} if ϕi(%I
) 6%sdi ϕi(%
′
i,%−i). Agent i strongly manipulates ϕ at ≻I by reporting ≻
′
i if ϕi(%
′
i,%−i) ≻
sd
i
ϕi(%I). ϕ is (weakly) strategy-proof if it is never (strongly) manipulated.
3 Inadequacy of trading cycles
In the housing market model, every agent owns a distinct object. The procedure of TTC is
simple: At each step, by letting agents point to favorite objects and objects point to owners,
we find cycles and let the agents in each cycle exchange endowments. Clearly, at each step
cycles must exist and be disjoint. To extend TTC to the FEE model, a straightforward idea
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is to let agents point to favorite objects and objects point to all of their owners (to avoid
discrimination among owners), and then clear cycles. However, two examples in this section
illustrate the problem with this idea.
Example 1 shows that the cycles generated as above can be complicated and not disjoint,
so that it is unclear how to clear cycles to obtain an efficient and fair assignment.
Example 1. Consider five agents {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and five objects {o1, o2, o3, o4, o5}. Agents
have endowments and preferences shown in Table 1. Letting agents point to favorite objects
and objects point to all of their owners, we obtain Figure 1. The weight of every edge o→ i
denotes the amount of o owned by i.
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
1 1/2 1/2 0 0 0
2 1/2 1/2 0 0 0
3 0 0 1/4 1/2 1/4
4 0 0 1/4 1/2 1/4
5 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
(a) Endowments
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4 ≻5
o3 o4 o4 o1 o3
o4 o3 o3 o4 o5
o1 o1 o1 o3 o1
o2 o2 o5 o5 o2
o5 o5 o2 o2 o4
(b) Preferences
Table 1
o1
o5
o3
o4
o2 1
2 3
4 51/2
1/2
1/2
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
Figure 1
There are five cycles in the figure: o1 → 1 → o3 → 3 → o4 → 4 → o1, o1 → 1 →
o3 → 4 → o1, o1 → 2 → o4 → 4 → o1, o4 → 3 → o4, and o3 → 5 → o3. These cycles are
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not disjoint. Some share edges and some nest the others.9 These cycles cannot be cleared
simultaneously as in TTC. Which cycles to clear and how to clear them are crucial for
efficiency and fairness. One idea is to find some way to clear all cycles simultaneously and
fairly. Another idea is to select disjoint cycles by some rule and then clear them fairly. In
Online Appendix E, we discuss several ways to implement these ideas but show that they are
undesirable in fairness.
Example 2 shows that even though the cycles generated as above are disjoint, clearing
all of them does not give us a fair assignment.
Example 2. Consider four agents {1, 2, 3, 4} and three objects {o1, o2, o3}. Agent 1 owns
1/2o1 and most prefers o1. Agent 2 owns 1/4o2 and prefers o1 to o3 and o3 to o2. Agent 3
owns 1/4o2 and most prefers o3. Agent 4 owns 1/4o3 and most prefers o2. The remaining
amounts of objects are owned by other agents omitted for simplicity.10 Letting agents point
to favorite objects and objects point to all of their owners, we obtain Figure 2.
1
2 34
o1
o2
o3
1/2
1/4 1/4
1/4
Figure 2
There are two cycles and they are disjoint. If we clear both cycles, 1 obtains his endow-
ment 1/2o1, 3 and 4 exchange endowments so that 3 obtains 1/4o3 and 4 obtains 1/4o2,
and 2 remains with his endowment 1/4o2. This assignment is unfair for 2. Because 1 most
prefers o1, in any IR assignment 1 must obtain 1/2o1. After removing 1 and his endowment,
2 and 3 essentially have equal preferences. But letting 3 and 4 exchange endowments before
2 points to o3, 2 has no chance to exchange endowments with 4 to obtain any amount of o3.
This makes the assignment violate EENE.
9A cycle is nested by another cycle if every node in the former cycle is involved in the latter cycle.
10Without loss of generality, let omitted agents most prefer their endowments.
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4 Fractional Top Trading Cycle
As TTC, our FTTC lets agents report favorite objects step by step. But FTTC uses linear
equations to define how agents trade endowments at each step. The key to our equations is
the balanced trade condition, which requires that at each step the amount of favorite object
obtained by each agent be equal to the amount of endowments he loses.
We define some notations. At the end of step d, let I(d) and O(d) respectively denote the
set of remaining agents and the set of remaining objects; let ω(d) = (ωi,o(d))i∈I,o∈O denote
remaining endowment matrix; let p(d) = (pi,o(d))i∈I,o∈O denote the found assignment by
step d, where pi,o(d) is the amount of object o obtained by agent i; let oi(d) denote agent i’s
favorite object among O(d− 1). At step d, let xi(d) denote the amount of oi(d) obtained by
i ∈ I(d − 1), and let xo(d) denote the total amount of o ∈ O(d− 1) assigned to agents. So
by definition, for all o ∈ O(d− 1),
xo(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1)
oi(d)=o
xi(d).
If no agents report an object o ∈ O(d− 1) as favorite at step d, xo(d) = 0.
Because all objects are owned by agents, xo(d) is also the total amount of o lost by its
owners from their endowments at step d. Different owners may lose different amounts of o.
We use a parameter λi,o(d) to denote the ratio of the amount lost by agent i to the total
amount xo(d). In other words, i loses the amount λi,o(d)xo(d) of o from his endowments at
step d. We put these parameters into a matrix λ(d) =
(
λi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O(d−1)
, and call it
ratio matrix. λ(d) satisfies that, for all i ∈ I(d − 1) and all o ∈ O(d − 1), λi,o(d) ∈ [0, 1],∑
i∈I(d−1) λi,o(d) = 1, and λi,o(d) > 0 only if ωi,o(d−1) > 0. The total amount of endowments
that each i ∈ I(d−1) loses at step d is
∑
o∈O(d−1) λi,o(d)xo(d). So the balanced trade condition
requires that, for all i ∈ I(d− 1),
xi(d) =
∑
o∈O(d−1)
λi,o(d)xo(d).
We use another parameter βi,o(d) to control the maximum amount of o ∈ O(d− 1) that
i ∈ I(d − 1) can lose at step d. That is, λi,o(d)xo(d) ≤ βi,o(d). For all i ∈ I(d − 1) and all
o ∈ O(d− 1), 0 ≤ βi,o(d) ≤ ωi,o(d− 1). We call β(d) =
(
βi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O(d−1)
quota matrix.
Now we are ready to present the procedure of FTTC.
Fractional Top Trading Cycle
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Initialization: I(0) = I, O(0) = O, ω(0) = ω, and p(0) = 0.
Step d ≥ 1: Each i ∈ I(d − 1) reports his favorite remaining object oi(d). Given a
pair of λ(d) and β(d), let x∗(d) = (x∗a(d))a∈I(d−1)∪O(d−1) denote the maximum solution
to the equation system

xo(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1)
oi(d)=o
xi(d) for all o ∈ O(d− 1),
xi(d) =
∑
o∈O(d−1) λi,o(d)xo(d) for all i ∈ I(d− 1),
(1)
that satisfies the constraints
λi,o(d)xo(d) ≤ βi,o(d) for all i ∈ I(d− 1) and o ∈ O(d− 1). (2)
For all i ∈ I and all o ∈ O, let pi,o(d) = pi,o(d−1)+x
∗
i (d) if i ∈ I(d−1) and o = oi(d);
otherwise let pi,o(d) = pi,o(d−1). Let ωi,o(d) = ωi,o(d−1)−λi,o(d)xo(d) if i ∈ I(d−1) and
o ∈ O(d− 1); otherwise let ωi,o(d) = ωi,o(d− 1). Let I(d) = {i ∈ I :
∑
o∈O ωi,o(d) > 0}
and O(d) = {o ∈ O :
∑
i∈I(d) ωi,o(d) > 0}. If O(d) is empty, stop the procedure;
otherwise go to step d+ 1.
In the next section we prove that the solutions to the equation system (1) exist. Con-
straints (2) pin down the maximum solution: for any other solution x(d) that satisfies (2),
x
∗
a(d) ≥ xa(d) for all a ∈ I(d − 1) ∪ O(d − 1) and x
∗
a(d) > xa(d) for some a. The linear
equations (1) can be solved by many well-developed computation methods and computer
programs. In simple examples, they can be solved by hand.
Each step of FTTC takes a pair of λ(d) and β(d) as inputs. By choosing different λ(d)
and β(d), we obtain different mechanisms. So we define a class of FTTC mechanisms. The
choice of λ(d) is usually related to fairness. It determines how the owners of each object
divide the right of using the object to trade with the others. We discuss fairness in Section
6. The choice of β(d) is usually related to the speed of FTTC (yet it may also be used to
control fairness as shown in Section 7). For example, by choosing βi,o(d) = ωi,o(d − 1), we
let agents trade endowments as much as possible at each step. It means that at each step
at least one agent uses up his endowment of some object, so FTTC must stop in at most
|I|×|O| steps. In general, as long as a (fixed) minimum amount of objects are traded at each
step, FTTC stops in finite steps. To illustrate the procedure defined above, in Appendix D
we use a specific FTTC presented in Section 7 to solve Example 1. The procedure to solve
Example 2 is straightforward. For example, if we want 2 and 3 to have equal rights to use
o2 to trade with the others, we will only clear the cycle o1 → 1 → o1 in Figure 2.
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5 Leontief model and absorbing set
The procedure of FTTC needs to solve linear equations at each step. The coefficient matrix
does not have full rank, but we prove that its solutions exist. Then the constraints pin down
the maximum solution, which is nonnegative.
Proposition 1. At each step d of FTTC, the maximum solution x∗(d) to (1) subject to (2)
exists and is nonnegative.
The proof relies on an observation that the equation system (1) essentially describes an
equilibrium that has been studied in the closed Leontief input-ouput model (Leontief, 1941).
Specifically, the coefficient matrix of (1) is stochastic; that is, its every column sums to one.
This is also the key feature of the Leontief model. Existing studies on the Leontief model
(Peterson and Olinick, 1982; Leon, 2015) imply Proposition 1. In Appendix A we provide a
self-contained proof.
The Leontief model describes an economy consisting of n industries that produce n dif-
ferent products. Each industry requires input of the products from the other industries and
possibly also of its own. Let auv ∈ [0, 1] denote the amount of input from the u-th indus-
try that necessary to produce one unit of output in the v-th industry (by a unit we mean
one dollar’s worth). Let xu denote the units of output produced by the u-th industry. By
definition, x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) satisfies the set of linear equations:
xu = au1x1 + au2x2 + · · ·+ aunxn for all u = 1, 2, . . . , n.
That is, all output of the u-th industry becomes input into the other industries and possibly
its own. When the economy reaches an equilibrium, every industry makes a least zero profit.
Eventually, all industries make zero profits, and thus
∑n
u=1 auv = 1 for all v = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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Similarly, at each step d of FTTC, suppose I(d − 1) = {i1, . . . , in} and O(d − 1) =
{o1, . . . , om}. Then the equation system (1) can be written as
[
0 Bn×m
Cm×n 0
]
xi1(d)
...
xin(d)
xo1(d)
...
xom(d)

 =


xi1 (d)
...
xin (d)
xo1(d)
...
xom(d)

 , (3)
11In equilibrium, the cost of producing one unit of output in every v-th industry is no greater than one
dollar. That is,
∑
n
u=1
auv ≤ 1. By definition,
∑
n
v=1
auvxv = xu. Thus,
∑
n
u=1
∑
n
v=1
auvxv =
∑
n
u=1
xu.
Rearranging terms, we have
∑
n
v=1
(
∑
n
u=1
auv)xv =
∑
n
u=1
xu. So
∑
n
u=1
auv = 1.
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where Bn×m = (bu,v) and Cm×n = (cv,u) are such that, for all u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all v ∈
{1, . . . , m},
bu,v = λiu,ov(d), cv,u =

1, if ov = oiu(d),0, otherwise.
In words, Bn×m coincides with λ and Cm×n indicates agents’ favorite objects. Let A denote
the coefficient matrix of (3). The definition of λ and agents’ strict preferences imply that
every column of A sums to one.
In the equilibrium of the Leontief model, industries form autonomous sub-economies.
Similar happens at each step of FTTC. In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that some
agents and objects form disjoint groups that we call absorbing sets. The agents in each
absorbing set trade their endowments in the absorbing set among themselves, and the agents
and objects not in any absorbing set are not involved in any trade. In this sense, absorbing
sets are extensions of cycles in TTC, and FTTC can be regarded as a procedure of clearing
absorbing sets. In the housing market model, absorbing sets reduce to cycles and FTTC
reduces to TTC.
Formally, at each step d, we generate a graph by letting agents point to favorite objects
and letting every o ∈ O(d − 1) point to every i ∈ I(d − 1) such that λi,o(d) > 0. We say
there is a directed path from a node v to another node v′ if there exists a sequence of nodes
v1, v2, . . . , vz such that v1 = v, vz = v
′, and for every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , z − 1}, vℓ points to vℓ+1.
Definition 1. A subset V ⊂ I(d− 1) ∪ O(d− 1) is an absorbing set at step d if
1. V is inside connected: within V there is a directed path from every node to every other
node;
2. V has no outgoing edge: there is no directed path from any node in V to any node
outside of V .
If an agent i belongs to an absorbing set V , his favorite object oi(d) belongs to V ; if
an object o belongs to V , every i ∈ I(d − 1) with λi,o(d) > 0 belongs to V . If we restrict
the equations (1) and constraints (2) to the nodes in each absorbing set V and denote the
maximum solution by x∗V (d), then x
∗
V (d) tells us how the agents in V trade their endowments
in V among themselves at step d. Let V1, . . . , Vk denote the absorbing sets at step d, and
let U denote the set of agents and objects not in any absorbing set. Then the maximum
solution x∗(d) at step d is simply the combination of x∗V (d):
x
∗(d) = (x∗V1(d), . . . ,x
∗
Vk
(d), 0U).
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In the two examples in Section 3, if λi,o(1) > 0 if and only if ωi,o > 0, then the nodes other
than o2, o5 constitute the only absorbing set in Figure 1, and agent 1 and his endowment o1
constitute the only absorbing set in Figure 2.
Remark 1. We can directly prove the existence of absorbing sets, their disjointness, and the
fact that agents in each absorbing set trade endowments among themselves.
• Existence is implied by the following facts: first, the whole graph has no outgoing edge;
second, if a set of nodes has no outgoing edge but is not inside connected, then it must
contain a strict subset that has no outgoing edge;12 last, every singleton set is inside
connected.
• Suppose two absorbing sets share a node. Then there must be a directed path from
every node in one absorbing set to the shared node, and another directed path from the
shared node to every node in the other absorbing set. This is a contradiction.
• Suppose an agent outside of an absorbing set obtains a positive amount of some object
in the absorbing set. Because the agents in the absorbing set do not obtain any amount
of objects outside of the absorbing set, the aggregate balanced trade condition for the
agents in the absorbing set is violated.
6 Efficiency and fairness
FTTC can satisfy efficiency and fairness simultaneously. We first prove that FTTC is indi-
vidually rational and sd-efficient. It is the obvious consequence of stepwise balanced trade.
Proposition 2. FTTC is individually rational and sd-efficient.
We then present conditions on the parameters in FTTC to ensure various fair axioms.
ETE and EENE are standard axioms that require fairness among “equal” agents. In the house
allocation model, EENE is known as envy-freeness because all agents have equal endowments.
In the FEE model agents may own different endowments. This motivates us to define a new
axiom that requires fairness among agents of unequal endowments. The axiom allows for
12If V ⊂ I(d − 1) ∪ O(d − 1) has no outgoing edge but is not inside connected, then there exist v, v′ ∈ V
such that there is no directed path from v to v′. Let V1 be the set of nodes in V that can be reached from
v through directed paths. Then v′ /∈ V1. Since V has no outgoing edge, there is no directed path from any
node in V1 to any node outside of V . The definition of V1 implies that there is no directed path from any
node in V1 to any node in V \V1. So V1 has no outgoing edge.
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envy among agents of unequal endowments, because sometimes envy is inevitable when we
also require IR and sd-efficiency. But we require that the envy between two agents should
be bounded by the difference in their endowments. For example, if an agent owns slightly
more endowments than another agent, but he obtains a much better lottery than the second
agent, we regard the assignment as unfair. When an agent i envies another agent j in an
assignment p, we use maxo∈O
[∑
o′%io
pj,o′ −
∑
o′%io
pii,o′
]
to measure i’s envy towards j.
Definition 2. A mechanism ϕ satisfies bounded envy if, for all ≻I∈ P
|I| and all i, j ∈ I,
max
o∈O
[ ∑
o′%io
ϕj,o′(≻I)−
∑
o′%io
ϕi,o′(≻I)
]
≤
∑
o∈O:ωj,o>ωi,o
(
ωj,o − ωi,o
)
.
It is clear that bounded envy implies EENE.
Now we present fairness conditions on the procedure of FTTC.
Definition 3. An FTTC satisfies
(1) stepwise equal treatment of equals (stepwise ETE) if at each step d, ωi(d − 1) =
ωj(d− 1) and oi(d) = oj(d) imply λi(d) = λj(d);
(2) stepwise equal-endowment equal treatment (stepwise EEET) if at each step d,
ωi(d− 1) = ωj(d− 1) implies λi(d) = λj(d);
(3) bounded advantage if at each step d, ωi,o(d− 1) ≥ ωj,o(d− 1) implies that λi,o(d) ≥
λj,o(d) and that ωi,o(d) ≥ ωj,o(d).
The first two conditions apply the ideas of ETE and EENE to the procedure of FTTC.
Note that λi(d) = λj(d) implies xi(d) = xj(d) and ωi(d − 1) − ωi(d) = ωj(d − 1) − ωj(d).
Stepwise ETE means that if two agents have equal remaining endowments at the beginning
of a step and they most prefer the same object at the step, then they obtain equal amounts
of the favorite object and lose equal amount of each endowment at the step. Stepwise EEET
means that if two agents have equal remaining endowments at the beginning of a step, they
obtain equal amounts of their respective favorite objects and lose equal amount of each
endowment at the step.
In the third condition, if ωi,o(d− 1) ≥ ωj,o(d− 1), bounded advantage implies that
0 ≤ λi,o(d)xo(d)− λj,o(d)xo(d) =
[
ωi,o(d− 1)− ωi,o(d)
]
−
[
ωj,o(d− 1)− ωj,o(d)
]
=
[
ωi,o(d− 1)− ωj,o(d− 1)
]
−
[
ωi,o(d)− ωj,o(d)
]
≤ωi,o(d− 1)− ωj,o(d− 1).
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So if i owns more of an object o than j at the beginning of step d, then i uses more of o
than j to trade with the others at step d, but the extra amount of o that i uses is bounded
by the difference between their remaining endowments of o.
Proposition 3. (1) An FTTC satisfying stepwise ETE satisfies ETE;
(2) An FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET satisfies EENE;
(3) An FTTC satisfying bounded advantage satisfies bounded envy.
The proofs for this section are presented in Appendix B.
7 Three fair FTTC
By now we have not presented any specific FTTC mechanism. In this section we present
three fair FTTC. They have different fairness motivations, but all of them satisfy bounded
advantage defined in Section 6. So they satisfy bounded envy, and thus EENE. We regard
them as good choices for applications that plan to use an FTTC mechanism.
The first mechanism is called equal-FTTC and denoted by T e. At each step, the remain-
ing owners of each object use equal amounts of the object to trade with the others. Formally,
at each step d, T e uses the following λe(d) and βe(d):
λei,o(d) =
1{ωi,o(d− 1) > 0}∑
j∈I(d−1) : 1{ωj,o(d− 1) > 0}
,
βei,o(d) = ωi,o(d− 1).
Here 1 is the indicator function. If two agents i and j both own an object o and ωi,o > ωj,o,
then they use equal amounts of o to trade at each step of T e until j uses up his endowment
of o earlier than i. In Appendix D we use T e to solve Example 1.
The second mechanism is called proportional-FTTC and denoted by T p. At each step,
the remaining owners of each object use amounts proportional to their endowments of the
object to trade with the others. Formally, at each step d, T p uses the following λp(d) and
βp(d):
λpi,o(d) =
ωi,o(d− 1)∑
j∈I(d−1) ωj,o(d− 1)
,
βpi,o(d) = ωi,o(d− 1).
If two agents own different amounts of an object, they use different amounts of the object to
trade at each step of T p, but they use up their endowments of the object at the same step.
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The third mechanism is called ordered-FTTC and denoted by T o. At each step, among
the remaining owners of each object, only those who own the most amount can use the
object to trade with the others, and the amount they can use is no more than the difference
between the most amount and the second most amount. Formally, T o uses the following
λo(d) and βo(d):
λoi,o(d) =
1{ωi,o(d− 1) = ω
{1}
o (d− 1)}∑
j∈I(d−1) : 1{ωj,o(d− 1) = ω
{1}
o (d− 1)}
,
βoi,o(d) = 1{ωi,o(d− 1) = ω
{1}
o (d− 1)}
[
ω{1}o (d− 1)− ω
{2}
o (d− 1)
]
,
where
ω{1}o (d− 1) = max{ωi,o(d− 1) : i ∈ I(d− 1)}, and
ω{2}o (d− 1) = max{ωi,o(d− 1) : i ∈ I(d− 1), ωi,o(d− 1) 6= ω
{1}
o (d− 1)}.
So if two agents i and j both own some object o and ωi,o > ωj,o, then i uses o to trade earlier
than j in T o, but once they use o at the same step, they use equal amounts, and they use
up their endowments of o at the same step.
Example 3 explains the difference between the three mechanisms.
Example 3. We modify Example 2 by removing agent 1 and object o1. Now agents 2 and
3 respectively own 1/2o2 and 1/4o2, and they prefer o3 to o2. Agent 4 owns ω4,o3 of o3 and
prefers o2 to o3.
2 34
o2
o3
1/2 1/4
ω4,o3
(a) Preferences and endowments
p2,o3
p3,o3
1/2
1/4
1/4
(3/8, 1/8)
(1/3, 1/6)
(1/4, 1/4)
T e
T oT p
(b) Assignments found by the three FTTC
Figure 3
Figure 3a shows agents’ preferences and endowments. When we vary ω4,o3 from 0 to 3/4,
the three lines in Figure 3b show the amounts of o3 obtained by 2 and 3 respectively in the
three mechanisms. The gray area is the set of IR assignments satisfying bounded envy.
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Take ω4,o3 = 1/2 for example. In T
e, 2 and 3 each use 1/4o2 to trade with 4. In T
p, 2
and 3 respectively use 1/3o2 and 1/6o2 to trade with 4. In T
o, at step one 2 uses 1/4o2 to
trade with 4; at step two 2 and 3 each use 1/8o2 to trade with 4. The three nodes in the three
lines in Figure 3b denote the assignments found by the three mechanisms.
The fairness motivations behind the three mechanisms are related to solution rules in
the classical bankruptcy problem. The bankruptcy problem describes a situation in which a
group of agents I claim on a resource, each claiming ci ∈ R+, but the amount of the resource
E ∈ R+ is not enough to satisfy all claims, that is,
∑
i∈I ci ≥ E. A solution rule is an awards
vector x ∈ Rn+ such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci for all i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I xi = E. Different fairness criteria
motivate different rules. We list three classical rules in Table 2.
Solution rule Definition
Constrained equal awards rule (CEA) ∃α ∈ R+ such that xi = min{ci, α}
Constrained equal losses rule (CEL) ∃α ∈ R+ such that xi = max{α− ci, 0}
Propositional rule (P) ∃α ∈ R+ such that xi = αci
Table 2: Three rules in the bankruptcy problem
In a rule x, xi and ci − xi are the award and loss of agent i. CEA equalizes the awards
of agents as much as possible. It first gives agents amounts of resource equal to the smallest
claim. It then removes satisfied agents and repeats the operation for the remaining agents.
In a symmetric manner, CEL equalizes the losses of agents as much as possible. The P rule
simply gives agents awards and losses proportional to their claims.
In Example 3, when ω4,o3 < 3/4, the example can be regarded as a bankruptcy problem
in which 2 and 3 respectively claim 1/2o3 and 1/4o3, but there is no enough of o3 to satisfy
both claims. The three mechanisms find assignments equal to the solutions found by the
three rules. In this sense the three mechanisms are analogous to the three rules. Moreover,
the bounded advantage condition in Section 6 is analogous to the order preservation property
in the bankruptcy problem (Aumann and Maschler, 1985). Order preservation requires that
the awards and losses of any two agents should be ordered as their claims are; that is, if
ci ≥ cj, then xi ≥ xj and ci − xi ≥ cj − xj . Many solution rules including the above
three satisfy order preservation. In bounded advantage, if ωi,o(d− 1) ≥ ωj,o(d− 1), the first
condition λi,o(d) ≥ λj,o(d) essentially requires that i receive more awards (more amount of
objects) than j, and the second condition ωi,o(d) ≥ ωj,o(d) essentially requires that i have
more loss (more unused endowments) than j.
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8 Core and incentive
8.1 Core
TTC finds the unique core assignment in the housing market model (Roth and Postlewaite,
1977). It means that no coalition of agents can obtain better objects than their TTC assign-
ments by reassigning endowments among themselves. In the FEE model, because stochastic
dominance is an incomplete relation over lotteries, there are more than one ways to define
blocking coalition and core. One way is to say that a coalition block an assignment if their
lotteries obtained by reassigning endowments stochastically dominate their lotteries in the
given assignment. Another way is to require that their lotteries obtained by reassigning en-
dowments should not be stochastically dominated by their lotteries in the given assignment.
The former definition is stronger and thus the induced core is bigger. We choose a definition
somehow in between. We believe that individuals are easier to block an assignment than non-
singleton coalitions since the latter requires coordination. So in our definition every agent can
block an assignment that is not IR for him (i.e., pi 6%
sd
i ωi), but every non-singleton coalition
can block an assignment if their lotteries obtained by reassigning endowments stochastically
dominate their lotteries in the given assignment.
Definition 4. A non-singleton coalition I ′ ⊂ I block an assignment p via another p′ if∑
i∈I′ p
′
i =
∑
i∈I′ ωi, p
′
i %
sd
i pi for all i ∈ I
′, and p′j ≻
sd
j pj for some j ∈ I
′. If p′i ≻
sd
i pi for
all i ∈ I ′, I ′ strongly block p. The core consists of IR assignments that are not blocked
by non-singleton coalitions. The weak core consists of IR assignments that are not strongly
blocked by non-singleton coalitions.
The above definitions reduce to the familiar ones in the housing market model.
Proposition 4. (1) There exists an FEE problem in which the core is empty.
(2) In every FEE problem there exists a weak core assignment satisfying ETE.
(3) There exists an FEE problem in which every weak core assignment violates EENE,
and every FTTC satisfying stepwise ETE fails to find a weak core assignment.
Appendix B presents two FEE problems that respectively satisfy the first and the third
statements. To prove the second statement, we endow agents with cardinal utilities consistent
with their ordinal preferences, and in particular endow “equal” agents with equal utilities.
We prove the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with slack by using the main theorem
of Mas-Colell (1992). We then construct a sequence of Walrasian equilibria with slack and
prove that their limit points are weak core assignments satisfying ETE.
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Although we do not answer whether there exists some FTTC always finding a weak core
assignment, from the third statement we know that if it exists, it violates stepwise ETE,
which is a weak fairness condition on the procedure of FTTC.
8.2 Incentive
TTC is the unique individually rational, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism in the
housing market model (Ma, 1994). However, a couple of impossibility theorems have shown
the conflict between efficiency, fairness, IR, and strategy-proofness in random allocation
problems. Specifically, in the house allocation model, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) prove
that any sd-efficient mechanism satisfying ETE is not strategy-proof. In the FEE model,
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011) prove that any IR and sd-efficient mechanism is not
strategy-proof, while Aziz (2018) prove that such a mechanism is not even weakly strategy-
proof. So every FTTC is not weakly strategy-proof in the FEE model. Example 4 from Aziz
(2018) explains this.
Example 4. There are two agents i, j and three objects o1, o2, o3. i owns 1/2o2 and 1/2o3,
while j owns 1/2o1. We omit the agents holding remaining amounts of objects for simplicity.
Consider the following preferences.
≻i ≻j
o1 o2
o2 o3
o3 o1
In any IR assignment p, i must obtain an amount of objects equal to 1 and j must obtain
an amount of objects equal to 1/2. If p is sd-efficient, i must obtain 1/2o1 from j and
i must give an amount 1/2 of endowment to j. There are two cases. If pj,o2 > 0, then
pi,o2 < 1/2. Now if i pretends to have the preference relation ≻
′
i: o2, o1, o3, then the only
IR and sd-efficient assignment is the one such that i obtains 1/2o1 and 1/2o2. So i strongly
manipulates the mechanism. If pj,o2 = 0, suppose j pretends to have the preference relation
≻′j : o2, o1, o3, then the only IR and sd-efficient assignment is the one such that j obtains
1/2o2. So j strongly manipulates the mechanism. So in any case one agent can strongly
manipulate an IR and sd-efficient mechanism.
As many papers in the literature, we evaluate the incentive property of FTTC in large
markets. We identify agents by their endowments and preferences, and classify them into
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types. A fair FTTC does not distinguish between agents of equal type. In a large FEE
problem in which each type consists of a large number of agents, if any agent misreports
his preferences, the distribution of the population of each type changes a little bit. If a fair
FTTC is insensitive to such a small change, which we formalize as a continuity property,
then the assignment found by the FTTC changes a little bit. If the FTTC satisfies EENE,
then the benefit from manipulation will be approximately zero as the market size increases.
In this sense we say the FTTC is asymptotically strategy-proof. We formalize this idea in
Appendix C, and simply state our result here.
Proposition 5. Any continuous FTTC that satisfies EENE is asymptotically strategy-proof.
The three mechanisms presented in Section 7 are continuous and satisfy EENE.
9 Applications
9.1 School choice with coarse priorities
Since the seminal paper Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), school choice has been inten-
sively studied under the assumption that schools use strict priorities, though real-life pri-
orities are often coarse. A few papers study the consequence of explicit tie breaking and
show its efficiency loss. For example, Erdil and Ergin (2008) show that tie breaking in-
troduces artificial stability constraints and makes deferred acceptance (DA) no longer con-
strained efficient. In the extreme case that all students have equal priority at all schools
(Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2011), TTC with ties broken uniformly at random is equivalent to RP
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998), which is ex-ant inefficient (Bogomolnaia and Moulin,
2001).13 In this subsection we adapt FTTC to solve school choice without explicitly breaking
ties.
Formally, the school choice model consists of a set of students I with preferences ≻I
and a set of schools O with priority rankings (%o)o∈O. Each %o is a complete and transitive
relation on I. Let ≻o and ∼o respectively denote the asymmetric and symmetric components
of %o. Two students i, j have equal priority at school o if i ∼o j. Intuitively, equal priority
means that the two students have equal rights over o. By interpreting equal priority as
equal ownerships, we extend the equal-FTTC mechanism T e to school choice. At each
step d, each remaining student reports his favorite remaining school. Among the remaining
students I(d − 1), let Io(d − 1) be the set of those who have highest priority at school o.
13 Two mechanisms are equivalent if they always find equal assignments.
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For each i ∈ Io(d − 1), we choose λi,o(d) = 1/|Io(d− 1)|. That is, students of equal highest
priority at a school use equal amounts of the school’s seats to join the trading process. At
each step students trade school seats as many as possible until some student is satisfied or
the seats of some school are exhausted. So we no longer introduce βi,o(d).
Extension of T e to school choice
Notations: Let I(d), O(d), oi(d), p(d) and x
∗(d) have same definitions as before.
Step d ≥ 1: Let each i ∈ I(d − 1) report his favorite school oi(d). Let x
∗(d) be the
maximum solution to the equations

xo(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1):oi(d)=o
xi(d) for all o ∈ O(d− 1),
xi(d) =
∑
o∈O(d−1):i∈Io(d−1)
xo(d)
|Io(d− 1)|
for all i ∈ I(d− 1),
that satisfies the constraints
xo(d) ≤ qo −
∑d−1
k=1 x
∗
o(k) for all o ∈ O(d− 1),
xi(d) ≤ 1−
∑d−1
k=1 x
∗
i (k) for all i ∈ I(d− 1).
Then for all i ∈ I and o ∈ O,
pi,o(d) =

pi,o(d− 1) + x
∗
i (d) if i ∈ I(d− 1) and o = oi(d),
pi,o(d− 1) otherwise.
Let I(d) = {i ∈ I :
∑d
k=1 x
∗
i (k) < 1} and O(d) = {o ∈ O :
∑d
k=1 x
∗
o(k) < qo}. If O(d)
or I(d) is empty, stop the procedure. Otherwise, go to step d+ 1.
As before, the found assignment is sd-efficient. By extending T e we also intend to make
the assignment fair. But to formalize the fairness here, we need to define hierarchical en-
dowments implied by coarse priorities and other notions. We omit the details because the
intuition has been implied by our main results. An obvious implication of the fairness here
is that, in the found assignment no student envies another student who has weakly lower
priority at all schools. In particular, there is no envy among students of equal priority at all
schools. We summarize this discussion as follows.
Result 1. In school choice with coarse priorities, the extension of T e is sd-efficient and fair.
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9.2 Time exchange
Many people around the world choose to exchange time and skills on centralized platforms
(e.g., time banks) without using transfers. Participants trade a wide range of services,
including legal assistance, babysitting, medical care, and many others. A time exchange
market can be described as an FEE problem. Objects are types of services that agents can
provide. Conceptually, service types can be as abstract as contracts in the matching theory
literature (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). Usually, a service type specifies at least the time
and location to finish a certain task. Each agent i’s endowment ωi,o ∈ [0, 1] is the amount
of service o that i can provide. One unit of a service could mean one hour, one day, or one
week, which depends on the context. Services can be regarded as divisible because time is
divisible (e.g., a half of a service could mean 12 hours).
In applications of our model in which objects are indivisible, we assume that each agent
demands one object. A difference in a time exchange market is that an agent may demand
several services and his demand over each service can be strictly between 0 and 1. So we
introduce di,o ∈ [ωi,o, 1] and di,o ∈ [0, ωi,o] to denote the upper bound and lower bound of i’s
demand over o. di,o can regarded as the amount of service o that i reserves for himself. An
assignment p is called feasible if, for all i ∈ I and all o ∈ O, pi,o ∈ [di,o, di,o]. Agents may
have complex preferences over bundles of services, but it may be impractical to elicit such
complex preferences. In our solution we let agents report ordinal preferences on services.
FTTC solves a time exchange market with the following modifications:
1. At each step d, let each remaining agent i report his favorite remaining service type o
that satisfies pi,o(d− 1) < di,o.
2. For all i ∈ I(d− 1) and o ∈ O(d− 1), λi,o(d) > 0 only if ωi,o(d− 1) > di,o.
3. The constraints (2) are replaced by λi,o(d)xo(d) ≤ ωi,o(d−1)−di,o and xi(d) ≤ di,oi(d)−
pi,oi(d)(d− 1) for all i ∈ I(d− 1) and o ∈ O(d− 1).
4. After each step d, an agent i remains if ωi,o(d) > di,o for some o ∈ O; a service type o
remains if ωi,o(d) > di,o for some i ∈ I.
To obtain a fair assignment, we can choose a fair FTTC mechanism. The three mecha-
nisms in Section 7 are candidates.
Result 2. In a time exchange market, a fair FTTC is feasible, individually rational, (feasibility-
constrained) sd-efficient, and fair.
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9.3 Geographically distributional constraints
Distributional constraints appear widely when a market designer wants to control the num-
ber of agents assigned to institutions. A prominent example is the Japanese medical resi-
dency match (Kamada and Kojima, 2015). Because hospitals in rural regions suffer doctor
shortages, the Japanese government imposes constraints on the number of doctors that the
hospitals in each geographic region should hire. The literature has been successful at dealing
with ceiling constraints, yet it demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with floor constraints.
Consequently, the Japanese government uses a modification of DA by imposing artificial
regional caps, which is proved to be inefficient by Kamada and Kojima. We use FTTC to
provide a different solution to the problem.
Formally, I is a set of doctors and O is a set of hospitals. Each constraint (S, q
S
, qS) is
characterized by a subset of hospitals S ⊂ O and a pair of integers (q
S
, qS) with 0 ≤ qS ≤ qS.
An assignment p satisfies the constraint if q
S
≤
∑
o∈S
∑
i∈I pi,o ≤ qS. We require the collec-
tion of constraints {(S, q
S
, qS)} form a hierarchy (Budish et al., 2013; Kamada and Kojima,
2014); that is, for any two constraint sets S and S ′, if S ∩ S ′ 6= ∅, then either S ⊂ S ′ or
S ′ ⊂ S. We also require that the collection include a capacity constraint ({o}, q
o
, qo) for each
hospital o ∈ O. We assume that all constraints are compatible. Assignments that satisfy all
constraints are called feasible.
Hospitals often prefer to hire more doctors as long as constraints are not violated. So
we assume that every hospital o weakly prefers a feasible assignment p′ to another feasible
assignment p if
∑
i∈I p
′
i,o ≥
∑
i∈I pi,o, and the preference is strict if the inequality is strict.
Taking account of all players’ preferences, we say a feasible assignment p is two-sided efficient
if there does not exist another feasible assignment p′ such that p′ strictly stochastically
dominates p for agents and
∑
i∈I p
′
i,o ≥
∑
i∈I pi,o for all o ∈ O.
14
Doctors do not have endowments in this problem. To apply FTTC, we choose a feasible
assignment ω and treat it as doctors’ endowment. It reflects doctors’ rights/obligations to
attend each hospital. We let doctors exchange their rights/obligations by running an FTTC
mechanism. Because the number of doctors assigned to each hospital does not change in
the procedure of FTTC, the found assignment must be feasible. To enhance efficiency and
fairness, we choose a fair ω and a fair FTTC as follows:
1. Let ω be a feasible assignment such that ωi,o = ωj,o for all i, j ∈ I and all o ∈ O, and
14Combe et al. (2018) study a teacher (re)assignment problem and define a similar two-sided efficiency
notion to take account of preferences of both teachers and schools.
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there does not exist another feasible assignment p′ such that∑
i∈I
p′i,o ≥
∑
i∈I
ωi,o for all o ∈ O, and∑
i∈I
p′i,o′ >
∑
i∈I
ωi,o′ for some o
′ ∈ O.
2. Regard ω as endowment and run an FTTC mechanism satisfying stepwise EEET.
Let p denote the found assignment. Because ω is feasible, p is also feasible. Because agents
have equal endowments in ω and we impose stepwise EEET, p is envy-free for doctors. This
is different than the priority-based fairness used by Kamada and Kojima (2015). Because
the numbers of doctors assigned to hospitals in ω cannot be Pareto improved, and given
that, p is sd-efficient for doctors. So p is two-sided efficient.
Result 3. In the Japanese medical residency match model, our method is feasible, envy-free
for agents, and two-sided efficient.
The initial assignment ω determines the numbers of doctors assigned to hospitals. So ω
determines the fairness among hospitals. We do not discuss how to evaluate such fairness and
how to choose ω. We leave this to the market designer.15 But note that our method cannot
solve constraints that distinguish between agents’ types, such as those in controlled school
choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003; Ehlers et al., 2014; Echenique and Yenmez, 2015;
Fragiadakis and Troyan, 2017). To solve such constraints, our method will start with a
feasible assignment and then let agents of equal type trade endowments among themselves.
But the found assignment is not ensured to be efficient. How to solve such constraints is an
interesting direction for future research.
9.4 House allocation
The literature since Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) often studies random allocation in the
house allocation model. The model has a simple setup: a number of objects are assigned to
an equal number of agents, and there is no endowment or priority structure that distinguishes
between agents. With ordinal preferences, the earliest well-known fair mechanism to solve
the model is Random Priority (RP; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998)). RP first draws
an ordering of agents uniformly at random and then lets agents sequentially choose favorite
objects. Observing the ex-ante inefficiency of RP, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) propose
15See Kamada and Kojima (2015) for some related discussion about fairness among hospitals.
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the class of simultaneous eating algorithms (SEA) and recommend PS because of its intuitive
fairness. In an SEA agents consume probability shares of favorite objects continuously in
the unit time interval with perhaps unequal rates. In PS agents’ rates are always equal to
one. Though the procedure of an SEA is continuous in time, we can identify discrete steps
so that agents consume favorite objects step by step.
We regard the house allocation model as an FEE problem in which agents own equal
divisions of all objects as endowments; that is, ωi,o = 1/|I| for all i ∈ I and all o ∈ O.
Then the IR notion coincides with the fairness axiom called equal-division lower bound in
the model (Thomson, 2011). In FTTC, agents also obtain favorite objects step by step. So
it is easy to make the following observations.
Result 4. In the house allocation model:
1. Every FTTC coincides with an SEA satisfying equal-division lower bound;
2. Every FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET coincides with PS.
The second result makes the relation between PS and TTC transparent. The relation is
first discovered by Kesten (2009), but Kesten shows the relation in a different way. Kesten
defines a probabilistic variant of TTC in which agents are endowed with equal divisions of
objects and decomposed into pseudo-agents who trade endowments on behalf of them. At
each step, to avoid redundancy and ensure fairness, Kesten carefully selects short cycles to
clear. These features make his mechanism complicated and not coincide with PS, though it
is equivalent to PS in outcomes.
In the house allocation with existing tenants model (HET; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
1999), in addition to social endowments O, a subset of agents called existing tenants further
own private endowments. This endowment structure can be translated into a coarse priority
structure in which social endowments rank all agents equally, and private endowments rank
owners highest and rank the others equally. Then our extension of T e in Section 9.1 becomes
an appealing solution to HET because of its intuitive fairness implied by the coarse priority
structure. Actually, the mechanism can be described as an extension of PS that incorporates
the feature of TTC: at any time t ∈ [0, 1],
• If a subset of existing tenants demand each other’s private endowments so that they
form a cycle, let them trade (fractional) endowments immediately.
• If there do not exist cycles among existing tenants, let agents consume their favorite
objects with following rates. First, all agents have basic eating rates of one. Second, if
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an exsiting tenant’s private endowment is being consumed by other agents, his eating
rate is instantly increased by an amount that is equal to the total rates of the agents
who are consuming his private endowment. We call this rule “you request my house -
I get your rate”.
The formal definition of this mechanism is presented in Online Appendix F. This mech-
anism is first presented in the third chapter of Zhang (2017). Using the technique of
Che and Kojima (2010), Zhang (2017) shows that this mechanism is asymptotically equiva-
lent to the “you request my house - I get your turn” mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
1999) in large markets. This result resembles the asymptotic equivalence between RP and
PS proved by Che and Kojima.
10 Conclusion
Top Trading Cycle is one of the few successful mechanisms in market design. Fairness in
various environments requires the use of randomization, yet TTC has to take deterministic
endowments or strict priorities as inputs. This restricts its application to random allocation
problems without losing its flagship efficiency property. To generalize TTC to random allo-
cation problems, we consider a direct extension of the housing market model and propose
the class of FTTC mechanisms. We drop the graph-based definition of TTC and use pa-
rameterized linear equations to describe balanced endowment exchange among agents. The
equations essentially describe an equilibrium that has been studied in the Leontief input-
output model. This enables us to prove that FTTC in our description is well-defined. FTTC
is individually rational and efficient. By choosing different parameter values in its definition,
FTTC satisfies different fairness axioms. As examples, we present three fair FTTC and con-
nect their fairness to three classical rules in the bankruptcy problem. We apply FTTC to a
couple of market design problems and obtain efficient and fair assignments in all of them. A
notable application is school choice with coarse priorities. The literature has demonstrated
that preference-independent tie breaking causes efficiency loss. Our application of FTTC
to school choice is efficient and fair, and does not explicitly breaking ties. In a companion
paper Yu and Zhang (2019), we extend FTTC to the full preference domain on which agents
may have weak preferences. FTTC preserves efficiency and fairness, and has interesting new
applications.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
In Section 5 we have explained that the equation system (1) can be written as (3), and if we
use
A = (aij)
m+n
i,j=1 =
[
0 Bn×m
Cm×n 0
]
to denote the coefficient matrix, then (3) can be written as Ax(d) = x(d), or
(I−A)x(d) = 0. (4)
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Let N = {1, . . . , m + n} be the index set of A. So every i ∈ N denotes an agent or an
object (here we use i as an index in N). A satisfies that, for all i, j ∈ N , aii = 0, aij ∈ [0, 1],
and
∑m+n
i=1 aij = 1. So A is a stochastic matrix. Because the sum of all columns of I−A is
zero, I−A is singular. So (4) must have nonzero solutions. We prove that there must exist
a maximum solution that is nonnegative and satisfies the constraints (2).
We first introduce some definitions. For any N ′ ⊂ N , let AN ′ = (aij)i,j∈N ′ be the
restriction of A to the index subset N ′. For any N ′′ ⊂ N ′ ⊂ N , AN ′′ is called a submatrix
of AN ′; if N
′′ ( N ′, AN ′ is called a strict submatrix of AN ′. AN ′′ is called isolated in AN ′ if
aij = 0 for all i ∈ N
′\N ′′ and j ∈ N ′′. For any N ′ ⊂ N , AN ′ is called isolated if it is isolated
in A; otherwise it is called unisolated. AN ′ is called reducible if it has a strict nonempty
submatrix that is isolated in AN ′; otherwise, it is called irreducible. For convenience, we say
N ′ is (un)isolated or (ir)reducible if AN ′ is (un)isolated or (ir)reducible.
Lemma 1. N can be uniquely partitioned into disjoint sets N1, N2, . . . , Nk, Nk+1 such that
(1) for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k, Nℓ is nonempty, isolated and irreducible;
(2) Nk+1, which can be empty, is either unisolated or reducible, and it does not contain
any strict nonempty subset that is isolated and irreducible.
Proof. We prove the lemma by constructing the partition. We first construct N1. If N is
irreducible, let N1 = N and we are done by letting k = 1 and N2 = ∅. Otherwise, N contains
a strict nonempty subset N ′ that is isolated. If N ′ is irreducible, let N1 = N
′. Otherwise,
N ′ contains a strict nonempty subset N ′′ that is isolated in N ′. Since N ′ is isolated, N ′′ is
isolated. If N ′′ is irreducible, let N1 = N
′′. Otherwise, N ′′ also contains a strict nonempty
subset N ′′′ that is isolated in N ′′. So N ′′′ is also isolated. Note that every submatrix that
consists of a single element must be irreducible. So by repeating the above argument we
must be able to find an irreducible and isolated nonempty subset. Let the subset be N1. We
then construct N2.
If N\N1 is irreducible and isolated, we are done by letting N2 = N\N1, k = 2, and
N3 = ∅. Otherwise, if N\N1 does not contain any strict nonempty subset that is irreducible
and isolated, we are done by letting k = 1 and N2 = N\N1. If N\N1 contains a strict
nonempty subset N ′ that is irreducible and isolated, let N2 = N
′. Then we construct N3
and possibly N4, . . . , Nk+1 from N\(N1 ∪ N2) in a similar way. Since N is a finite set, we
must stop in finite steps.
Lemma 1 implies that by permuting rows and columns, we can write A as the following
block form:
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A =


AN1
0
ZAN2
. . .
0
ANk
ANk+1


(5)
For every ℓ = 1, . . . , k + 1, let INℓ denote the identity matrix of dimension |Nℓ| × |Nℓ|.
Lemma 2. (1) Rank(INℓ −ANℓ) = |Nℓ| − 1 for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k;
(2) Rank(INk+1 −ANk+1) = |Nk+1|.
Proof. (1) For every ℓ = 1, . . . , k, since Nℓ is isolated, it must be that
∑
i∈Nℓ
aij = 1 for every
j ∈ Nℓ. Therefore, the sum of all columns of INℓ −ANℓ is zero. So det(INℓ −ANℓ) = 0 and
Rank(INℓ −ANℓ) < |Nℓ|.
Claim 1. For every nonempty N ′ ( Nℓ, there exists j ∈ N
′ such that
∑
i∈N ′ aij < 1.
Proof : Suppose
∑
i∈N ′ aij = 1 for all j ∈ N
′. Since
∑
i∈Nℓ
aij = 1 for all j ∈ Nℓ, it means
that aij = 0 for all i ∈ Nℓ\N
′ and j ∈ N ′. So AN ′ is isolated in ANℓ , which contradicts the
assumption that ANℓ is irreducible.
Corollary 3.3 of Peterson and Olinick (1982) states that for a general matrixD = (dij)
k
i,j=1
such that dij ∈ [0, 1] and
∑k
i=1 dij ≤ 1 for all j ∈ X = {1, . . . , k}, if det(Ik×k −D) = 0 and
det(I(k−1)×(k−1) −DX\j) 6= 0 for all j ∈ X, then every column of D sums to one. This result
and Claim 1 imply the following claim.
Claim 2. For every nonempty N ′ ( Nℓ, if det(IN ′ −AN ′) = 0, then there exists some
j ∈ N ′ such that det(IN ′\{j} −AN ′\{j}) = 0.
Proof : Suppose det(IN ′\{j}−AN ′\{j}) 6= 0 for all j ∈ N
′. By Corollary 3.3 of Peterson and Olinick
(1982), every column of AN ′ sums to one. But it contradicts Claim 1.
Now we prove that for all j ∈ Nℓ, det(INℓ\{j} − ANℓ\{j}) 6= 0. Suppose towards a
contradiction that det(INℓ\{j} − ANℓ\{j}) = 0 for some j ∈ Nℓ. By Claim 2, there exists
j1 ∈ Nℓ\{j} such that det(INℓ\{j,j1}−ANℓ\{j,j1}) = 0. By Claim 2 again, there further exists
j2 ∈ Nℓ\{j, j1} such that det(INℓ\{j,j1,j2} − ANℓ\{j,j1,j2}) = 0. By repeatedly using Claim 2,
we must find a submatrix consisting of only one element i ∈ Nℓ such that 1− aii = 0, which
contradicts the fact that aii = 0 for all i ∈ N . So det(INℓ\{j} −ANℓ\{j}) 6= 0 for all j ∈ Nℓ.
This implies that Rank(INℓ −ANℓ) = |Nℓ| − 1.
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(2) We first prove that ANk+1 is unisolated. Suppose it is isolated, then by definition
it must be reducible. So ANk+1 contains a strict nonempty submatrix AN ′ that is isolated
in ANk+1. Since ANk+1 is isolated, AN ′ is also isolated. Still by the definition of ANk+1,
AN ′ must be reducible. So AN ′ also contains a strict nonempty submatrix AN ′′ that is
isolated in AN ′. Since AN ′ is isolated, AN ′′ is also isolated. By the definition of ANk+1
again, AN ′′ must be reducible. By repeating this argument, we finally find a submatrix
consisting of a single element and conclude that it is reducible, which is a contradiction.
So ANk+1 is unisolated. It means that not every column of ANk+1 sums to one. Then by
Corollary 3.3 of Peterson and Olinick (1982) and same arguments as Claim 1 and Claim 2,
if det(INk+1 −ANk+1) = 0, then there must exist some i ∈ Nk+1 such that 1− aii = 0, which
is a contradiction. So det(INk+1 −ANk+1) 6= 0, which implies that Rank(INk+1 −ANk+1) =
|Nk+1|.
Given the block form (5), Lemma 2 implies that
Rank(I−A) =
k+1∑
ℓ=1
Rank(INℓ −ANℓ) = m+ n− k.
So (I−A)x(d) = 0 has k linearly independent solutions. Below we construct the k solutions.
For all every ℓ = 1, . . . , k, we consider the equation system (INℓ − ANℓ)xNℓ(d) = 0.
Since det(INℓ −ANℓ) = 0, 1 is an eigenvalue of ANℓ . Since ANℓ is irreducible, by Frobenius
Theorem (see Section 6.8 of Leon, 2015), 1 has a positive eigenvector x˜Nℓ(d) that is a solution
to (INℓ −ANℓ)xNℓ(d) = 0. Recall that A can be written in the block form (5). So
x˜ℓ(d) = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓ−1
, x˜Nℓ(d), 0, . . . , 0)
is a nonnegative solution to (I−A)x(d) = 0. It is clear that the k solutions x˜1(d), x˜2(d), . . . , x˜k(d)
are linearly independent. Therefore, every solution to (I−A)x(d) = 0 is a linear combination
of the k solutions. That is, there exist y1, . . . , yk ∈ R such that
x(d) = y1


x˜N1(d)
0
0
...
0


+ y2


0
x˜N2(d)
0
...
0


+ · · ·+ yk


0
...
0
x˜Nk(d)
0


.
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For every ℓ = 1, . . . , k, define
y∗ℓ = min
{
βi,o(d)
λi,o(d)x˜o(d)
: o ∈ Nℓ, i ∈ Nℓ, λi,o(d) > 0
}
.
Then,
x
∗(d) =
k∑
ℓ=1
y∗ℓ x˜ℓ(d)
is the maximum solution that satisfies the constraints:
λi,o(d)xo(d) ≤ βi,o(d) for all i ∈ I(d− 1) and o ∈ O(d− 1).
In the remaining part of this section, we show that {Nℓ}1≤ℓ≤k defined in Lemma 1 is the
set of absorbing sets at step d.
Lemma 3. Any N ′ ⊂ N is an absorbing set if and only if AN ′ is irreducible and isolated.
Proof. (Only if) Let N ′ be an absorbing set. So every node j ∈ N ′ does not effectively point
to any node i ∈ N\N ′. In the definition of A, it means that aij = 0 for all i ∈ N\N
′ and
j ∈ N ′. So AN ′ is isolated. Suppose AN ′ is reducible. Then there is a strict subset N
′′ of N ′
such that AN ′′ is isolated in N
′. It means that aij = 0 for all i ∈ N
′\N ′′ and all j ∈ N ′′. In
the generated graph it means that there is no path from every node in N ′ to every node in
N ′\N ′′, which contradicts the assumption that N ′ is an absorbing set. So AN ′ is irreducible
and isolated.
(If) Let AN ′ be irreducible and isolated. Being isolated directly implies that there is no
path from every node in N ′ to every node not in N ′. Suppose there exist two nodes i, j ∈ N ′
such that there is no path from i to j. Let N1 be the subset of N
′ such that there is a path
from i to every k ∈ N1. Let N2 be the set of remaining nodes in N
′. Obviously, i ∈ N1 and
j ∈ N2. Then there must be no path from every node in N1 to every node in N2; otherwise,
there would be a path from i to every node in N2, which contradicts the definition of N2. It
means that aij = 0 for all i ∈ N2 and all j ∈ N1. So AN2 is isolated in AN ′ , which contradicts
the assumption that AN ′ is irreducible. So N
′ must be an absorbing set.
B Proofs of Proposition 2, 3, and 4
Proof of Proposition 2. (Individual rationality) At each step d, for all i ∈ I(d−1) and all
o ∈ O(d−1) with ωi,o(d−1) > 0, oi(d) %i o. Suppose the assignment p found by FTTC is not
individually rational. Then there exist o∗ ∈ O and i ∈ I such that
∑
o%io∗
pi,o <
∑
o%io∗
ωi,o.
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Let d be the earliest step after which all objects in {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} are exhausted. That
is, {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} ∩ O(d) = ∅ and {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} ∩ O(d − 1) 6= ∅. Then i’s favorites
objects from step one to step d must belong to {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗}, and
∑
o%io∗
pi,o is the total
amount of objects obtained by i at the end of step d. But given
∑
o%io∗
pi,o <
∑
o%io∗
ωi,o,
the balanced trade condition implies that there must exist o′ %i o
∗ such that ωi,o′(d) > 0.
This is a contradiction.
(Sd-efficiency) Still let p denote the assignment found by FTTC. Define a binary relation
⊲ on O: o⊲ o′ if, for some i ∈ I, o ≻i o
′ and pi,o′ > 0. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and
Che and Kojima (2010) have shown that p is sd-efficient if and only if ⊲ is acyclic. Since in
FTTC an agent reports an object only if all better objects are exhausted, for any o ≻i o
′
and pi,o′ > 0, o must be exhausted earlier than o
′. So ⊲ must be acyclic.
Proof of Proposition 3. (1) For any FTTC that satisfies stepwise ETE, if any two agents
i, j have equal endowments and equal preferences, then at step one they report the same
favorite object and λi(1) = λj(1). So they obtain equal amounts of the favorite object and
their remaining endowments after step one are equal. By induction it is easy to see that this
holds for all remaining steps. So the two agents must obtain equal lotteries.
(2) Similarly, for any FTTC that satisfies stepwise EEET, if any two agents i, j have equal
endowments, then at each step d it must be that λi(d) = λj(d). It means that the two agents
obtain equal amounts of their respective favorite objects at each step. Suppose i envies j
in the found assignment p. Then there exists o∗ ∈ O such that
∑
o%io∗
pi,o <
∑
o%io∗
pj,o.
Let d be the earliest step after which all objects in {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} are exhausted.
Then i’s favorite objects from step one to step d must belong to {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗}, and∑
o%io∗
pi,o is the total amount of objects obtained by i at the end of step d. So we should
have
∑
o%io∗
pj,o ≤
∑d
d′=1 xj(d
′) =
∑
o%io∗
pi,o. This is a contradiction.
(3) Let p denote the assignment found by any FTTC satisfying bounded advantage. For
any distinct i, j ∈ I, let o∗ be the solution to maxo∈O
[∑
o′%io
pj,o′ −
∑
o′%io
pi,o′
]
. Let d be
the earliest step after which all o %i o
∗ are exhausted. That is, {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} ∩O(d) = ∅
and {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} ∩ O(d− 1) 6= ∅. By the balanced trade condition,∑
o%io∗
pi,o =
∑
o∈O
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)
and
∑
o%io∗
pj,o ≤
∑
o∈O
(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
.
For all o ∈ O such that ωi,o ≥ ωj,o, bounded advantage implies that for all 1 ≤ d
′ ≤
d, ωi,o(d
′) ≥ ωj,o(d
′) and λi,o(d
′) ≥ λj,o(d
′). So ωj,o − ωj,o(d) =
∑d
d′=1 λj,o(d
′)x∗o(d
′) ≤∑d
d′=1 λi,o(d
′)x∗o(d
′) = ωi,o − ωi,o(d). Equivalently,(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)
≤ 0.
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For all o ∈ O such that ωi,o < ωj,o, bounded advantage implies that for all 1 ≤ d
′ ≤ d,
ωi,o(d
′) ≤ ωj,o(d
′) and λi,o(d
′) ≤ λj,o(d
′); in particular, ωi,o(d) ≤ ωj,o(d). So(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)
≤ ωj,o − ωi,o.
Therefore, ∑
o%io∗
pj,o −
∑
o%io∗
pi,o ≤
∑
o∈O
[(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)]
=
∑
o∈O:ωi,o≥ωj,o
[(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)]
+
∑
o∈O:ωi,o<ωj,o
[(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)]
≤
∑
o∈O:ωi,o<ωj,o
(
ωj,o − ωi,o
)
.
Thus, p satisfies bounded envy.
Proof of Proposition 4. We first prove the second statement (2). For any FEE prob-
lem, we construct a sequence of Walrasian equilibria with slack and prove that the limit
points are weak core assignments satisfying ETE.16 We endow each agent i with von Neu-
mann–Morgenstern utilities (ui,o)o∈O ∈ R
|O|
+ such that o ≻i o
′ if and only if ui,o > ui,o′. Two
agents of equal endowments and equal preferences are endowed with equal utilities. The
utility of obtaining nothing is normalized to zero. So every i’s expected utility of obtaining
a lottery pi is ui(pi) =
∑
o∈O ui,opi,o. Agents compare lotteries by expected utilities.
For any ε > 0, define i’s consumption space to be
Xεi = {xi is a lottery :
∑
o′%io
xi,o′ ≥
∑
o′%io
ωi,o′ − ε for all o ∈ O}.
It is clear that Xεi is nonempty, closed and convex. Then define the space of price vectors
to be
∆ = {P ∈ R
|O|
+ : ‖P‖ ≤ 1}.
The conditions (I) to (VI) in Mas-Colell (1992) are satisfied. His condition (V) is satisfied
because ε > 0 ensures that for every nonzero P ∈ ∆, P · ωi > infxi∈Xεi P · xi. By Mas-
Colell’s Theorem 1, for any ε > 0, there exists aWalrasian equilibrium with slack (WE-slack)
(xε, P ε, αε) such that
16 Basteck (2018) uses a similar method to prove the existence of weak core from equal division in the
house allocation problem.
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1. P ε ∈ ∆ and αε ≥ 0;
2.
∑
i∈I x
ε
i,o =
∑
i∈I ωi,o for all o ∈ O;
3. xεi ∈ argmax{ui(xi) : xi ∈ X
ε
i , P · xi ≤ P · ωi + α
ε} for all i ∈ I.
The facts that xεi ∈ X
ε
i for all i and that
∑
i∈I x
ε
i,o =
∑
i∈I ωi,o for all o imply that x
ε is
an assignment. Actually xε can be chosen to satisfy ETE. To see it, let {I1, · · · , IK} be
the partition of agents such that each Iℓ consists of agents of equal endowments and equal
preferences. Given any WE-slack (xε, P ε, αε), for every Iℓ and every i ∈ Iℓ, define
yεi =
∑
j∈Iℓ
xεj
|Iℓ|
.
It is clear that yεi ∈ X
ε
i , P
ε · yεi ≤ P ·ωi+α
ε, and yεi solves i’s expected utility maximization
(since expected utility functions are linear). It is also obvious that
∑
i∈I y
ε
i,o =
∑
i∈I ωi,o for
all o. So (yǫ, P ε, αε) is a WE-slack and yǫ satisfies ETE.
Let (εk)k∈N be a sequence of positive numbers such that ε
k → 0 as k → ∞. For each
εk, let (xk, P k, αk) be a WE-slack that satisfies ETE. Since (xk)k∈N is bounded, it has limit
points (the limits of convergent subsequences). Let x∗ be any limit point. Since each xk is
an assignment satisfying ETE, x∗ must be an assignment satisfying ETE. Moreover, for all i,
xki ∈ X
εk
i implies that x
∗
i ∈ X
0
i , which means that x
∗ is individually rational. We prove that
x∗ is a weak core assignment. Suppose towards a contradiction that for some non-singleton
coalition I ′ there exists a different assignment x′ such that
∑
i∈I′ x
′
i =
∑
i∈I′ ωi and x
′
i ≻
sd
i x
∗
i
for all i ∈ I ′. So for every i ∈ I ′, x′i ∈ X
εk
i for all k and ui(x
′
i) > ui(x
∗
i ). Since x
∗ is a limit
point of (xk)k∈N, there exists a large enough n ∈ N such that ui(x
′
i) > ui(x
n
i ) for all i ∈ I
′.
It implies that P n · x′i > P
n · ωi + α
n ≥ P n · ωi for all i ∈ I
′. But it contradicts the fact that
P n ·
∑
i∈I′ x
′
i = P
n ·
∑
i∈I′ ωi.
Below we present two FEE problems that respectively satisfy (1) and (3).
Example 5. Suppose there are four agents I = {1, 2, 3, 4} and four objects O = {o1, o2, o3, o4}.
Consider two FEE problems in which agents have same endowments but they respectively have
the preferences ≻I and ≻
′
I in Table 3.
(Core can be empty) Let p be an IR assignment for the problem (≻I). IR requires that,
for all i ∈ I, pi,o1 + pi,o2 = 1/2 and pi,o3 + pi,o4 = 1/2; in particular, agent 4 must obtain his
endowment in p. Then p is not blocked by {1, 3} through exchanging endowments if and only
if p1 = ω3 and p3 = ω1. Similarly, p is not blocked by {2, 3} through exchanging endowments
if and only if p2 = ω3 and p3 = ω2. So p is a core assignment only if p1 = p2 = ω3 and
p3 = ω1 = ω2, which is impossible given p4 = ω4. So p is not a core assignment.
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o1 o2 o3 o4
1 1/2 0 1/2 0
2 1/2 0 1/2 0
3 0 1/2 0 1/2
4 0 1/2 0 1/2
(a) Endowments
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4
o2 o2 o1 o2
o1 o1 o2 o1
o4 o4 o3 o4
o3 o3 o4 o3
(b) ≻I
≻′1 ≻
′
2 ≻
′
3 ≻
′
4
o2 o1 o1 o1
o1 o2 o2 o2
o4 o4 o3 o4
o3 o3 o4 o3
(c) ≻′I
Table 3
(Weak core violates EENE) Let p be an IR assignment that satisfies EENE for the problem
(≻′I). IR requires that, for all i ∈ I, pi,o1 + pi,o2 = 1/2 and pi,o3 + pi,o4 = 1/2; in particular,
p2,o1 = 1/2 and p4,o4 = 1/2. EENE requires that p1,o4 = p2,o4 and p3,o1 = p4,o1. So p1,o4 =
p2,o4 ≤ 1/4 and p3,o1 = p4,o1 ≤ 1/4. It implies that p3,o2 = p4,o2 ≥ 1/4 and thus p1,o2 ≤ 1/2.
Then it means that {1, 3} can strongly block p by exchanging endowments. So p is not a
weak core assignment.
(FTTC satisfying stepwise ETE cannot find weak core) It is easy to verify that all FTTC
satisfying stepwise ETE must find an IR assignment that satisfies EENE for the problem
(≻′I). So any such FTTC cannot find weak core assignments.
C Asymptotic strategy-proofness
For any problemM = (I, O,≻I , ω), we assume that each i ∈ I has von Neumann–Morgenstern
utilities (ui,o)o∈O ∈ R
|O|
+ such that o ≻i o
′ if and only if ui,o > ui,o′. The utility of receiving ∅
is normalized to zero. So i’s expected utility of obtaining a lottery pi is ui(pi) =
∑
o∈O ui,opi,o.
We assume that agents use expected utilities to compare lotteries. Define ΩM = {ωˆ : ∃i ∈
I, ωˆ = ωi} to be the space of endowment types. We say an agent is type-(ωˆ,≻) if his
endowment is ωˆ and his preference relation is ≻. For all (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM × P, define
A(ωˆ,≻) =
|{i ∈ I : ωi = ωˆ,≻i=≻}|
|I|
to be the proportion of type-(ωˆ,≻) agents in the problem.
Fixing the set of object types O, we say a sequence of economies (M [n])∞n=1, where M
[n] =
(O, I [n],≻I [n] , ω
[n]), is regular if
(1) For all n ≥ 2, |I [n]| = n|I [1]| and ΩM [n] = ΩM [1] .
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(2) For all (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM [1] × P, there exists A
[∞](ωˆ,≻) ∈ (0, 1) such that
A[n](ωˆ,≻) → A[∞](ωˆ,≻) as n→∞.
(3) There exits K > 0 such that for all n ≥ 1, all i ∈ I [n], and all distinct lotteries pi and
p′i, |ui(pi)− ui(p
′
i)| < K ·maxo∈O |pi,o − p
′
i,o|.
Condition (1) says that as the market size increases, the number of agents increases but all
agents still hold endowment types same as the agents in the base economy M [1]. Condition
(2) says that as the market size increases, for every (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM [1] × P, the proportion of
type-(ωˆ,≻) agents converges to a positive fraction A[∞](ωˆ,≻). Condition (3) essentially says
that the vNM utilities of all agents in the sequence of economies have a common finite upper
bound.
A mechanism ϕ is asymptotically strategy-proof if, given any regular sequence (M [n])∞n=1,
for any ε > 0, there exists n∗ ∈ N such that for any n > n∗, if any i ∈ I [n] reports any
≻′i∈ P\{≻i} in the economy M
[n], then the utility gain from manipulation is bounded by ε:
ui
(
ϕi(≻
′
i,≻I [n]\{i})
)
< ui
(
ϕi(≻I [n])
)
+ ε.
For any FTTC that satisfies ETE and any regular sequence (M [n])∞n=1, let p
[n] denote
the assignment found for each M [n], and, for every (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM [1] × P, let p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻) denote
the lottery assigned to type-(ωˆ,≻) agents in M [n]. We say two regular sequences (M [n])∞n=1
and (M˜ [n])∞n=1 converge to each other if ΩM [1] = ΩM˜ [1] , and, for all (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM [1] × P,
limn→∞A
[n](ωˆ,≻) = limn→∞ A˜
[n](ωˆ,≻). Then we say an FTTC satisfying ETE is continuous
if, for any two regular sequences (M [n])∞n=1 and (M˜
[n])∞n=1 that converge to each other and
any (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM [1] ×P, both limn→∞ p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻) and limn→∞ p˜
[n]
(ωˆ,≻) exist, and
lim
n→∞
p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻) = limn→∞
p˜
[n]
(ωˆ,≻).
Proof of Proposition 6. Given any regular sequence of problems (M [n])∞n=1, there exists
N > 0 such that for all n ≥ N and all (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM [1] ×P, the number of type-(ωˆ,≻) agents
in M [n] are more than one. Suppose for some (ωˆ,≻) ∈ ΩM [1] × P, some type-(ωˆ,≻) agent i
reports ≻′i∈ P\{≻i} in the economy M
[n]. Then we obtain a new economy M˜ [n] such that
|{i ∈ I˜ [n] : ω˜
[n]
i = ωˆ,≻i=≻}| = |{i ∈ I
[n] : ω
[n]
i = ωˆ,≻i=≻}| − 1,
|{i ∈ I˜ [n] : ω˜
[n]
i = ωˆ,≻i=≻
′}| = |{i ∈ I [n] : ω
[n]
i = ωˆ,≻i=≻
′}|+ 1,
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and the numbers of agents of other types in M˜ [n] and M [n] are equal. Then (M [n])n≥N and
(M˜ [n])n≥N are two regular sequences that converge to each other.
Let (p[n])n≥N and (p˜
[n])n≥N be the sequences of assignments found by a continuous FTTC
satisfying EENE for the two sequences of economies. By continuity,
lim
n→∞
p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′) = limn→∞
p˜
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′).
So for any ε > 0, there exists n∗(ωˆ,≻,≻′) > N such that, for all n > n∗(ωˆ,≻,≻′),
max
o∈O
|p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′),o − p˜
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′),o| < ε/K.
Thus,
|ui(p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′))− ui(p˜
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′))| < ε.
Since the FTTC satisfies EENE, p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻) %
sd p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′). So
ui(p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻)) ≥ ui(p
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′)) > ui(p˜
[n]
(ωˆ,≻′))− ε.
Define n∗ = max{n∗(ωˆ,≻,≻′) : (ωˆ,≻,≻′) ∈ ΩM × P × P,≻6=≻
′}. For all n > n∗, if any
i ∈ I [n] in M [n] misreports any ≻′i∈ P\{≻i}, then i’s utility gain is bounded by ε. So the
FTTC is asymptotically strategy-proof.
D Using T e to solve Example 1
• At step 1, we solve the equations

x1(1) = x2(1) = 1/2xo1(1) + 1/2xo2(1),
x3(1) = x4(1) = 1/3xo3(1) + 1/2xo4(1) + 1/3xo5(1),
x5(1) = 1/3xo3(1) + 1/3xo5(1),
xo1(1) = x4(1),
xo2(1) = xo5(1) = 0,
xo3(1) = x1(1) + x5(1),
xo4(1) = x2(1) + x3(1),
subject to the constraints
1/2xo1(1) ≤ 1/2, 1/2xo2(1) ≤ 1/2, 1/3xo3(1) ≤ 1/4, 1/2xo4(1) ≤ 1/2, 1/3xo5(1) ≤ 1/4.
17
17We omit the constraints 1/3xo3(1) ≤ 1/2 and 1/3xo5(1) ≤ 1/2 obtained from agent 5’s endowment.
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The maximum solution is
x
∗(1) =
(
x∗1(1) x
∗
2(1) x
∗
3(1) x
∗
4(1) x
∗
5(1) x
∗
o1
(1) x∗o2(1) x
∗
o3
(1) x∗o4(1) x
∗
o5
(1)
1/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 1/6 2/3 0 1/2 1 0
)
.
The nodes other than o2, o5 constitute the only absorbing set in Figure 1.
• At step 2, because o4 is exhausted, agents 2 and 3 report o3 as favorite. We omit the
equations and constraints. The maximum solution is
x
∗(2) =
(
x∗1(2) x
∗
2(2) x
∗
3(2) x
∗
4(2) x
∗
5(2) x
∗
o1
(2) x∗o2(2) x
∗
o3
(2) x∗o5(2)
1/24 1/24 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 0 3/12 0
)
.
At this step the nodes other than o2, o5 constitute the only absorbing set.
• At step 3, the maximum solution is the one such that 5 obtains 1/4o3. {o3, 5} is the
only absorbing set.
• At step 4, the maximum solution is the one such that 1 and 2 each obtain 1/8o1.
{1, 2, o1} is the only absorbing set.
• At step 5, the maximum solution is the one such that 1 and 2 each obtain 1/2o2, and
3, 4, and 5 each obtain 1/4o5. {1, 2, o2} and {3, 4, 5, o5} are two absorbing sets.
• At step 6, agent 5 is the only remaining agent who owns the remaining endowment
1/4o5. So 5 obtains 1/4o5.
• So T e finds the following assignment.
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
1 1/8 1/2 3/8 0 0
2 1/8 1/2 1/24 1/3 0
3 0 0 1/12 2/3 1/4
4 3/4 0 0 0 1/4
5 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
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Online Appendix (not for publication)
E Possible ideas to solve FEE by trading cycles
We discuss several ideas to solve the FEE model through clearing cycles, and apply them to
Example 1 in our paper. We show that these ideas are undesirable in fairness.
Recall that in Example 1, by letting agents point to favorite objects and objects point to
all owners, we obtain Figure 1.
o1
o5
o3
o4
o2 1
2 3
4 51/2
1/2
1/2
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
Figure 1
There are five cycles in the graph:
cycle 1: 3 → o4 → 3
cycle 2: 5 → o3 → 5
cycle 3: 1 → o3 → 4 → o1 → 1
cycle 4: 2 → o4 → 4 → o1 → 2
cycle 5: 1 → o3 → 3 → o4 → 4 → o1 → 1
These cycles are not disjoint and some nest the others. For example, cycle 3 and cycle 4
share the edge 4 → o1, and cycle 1 and cycle 3 are nested by cycle 5. If we want to use the
idea of clearing cycles to solve Figure 1, we need to answer (1) whether all cycles are cleared,
or only a subset of cycles are selected to clear, and (2) how much of objects is traded in
every (selected) cycle.
A1
E.1 Clearing non-redundant cycles
Because cycles are not disjoint and some nest the others, it seems difficult to clear all cycles
simultaneously and reasonable to select a subset of cycles to clear. The first idea observes
that some long cycles seem redundant in the presence of short cycles, because the agents in
such long cycles can obtain same objects by clearing short cycles. In Figure 1, cycle 5 is
redundant in the presence of cycle 1 and cycle 3, because every agent in cycle 5 can obtain
the object he points to by clearing cycle 1 or cycle 3. So clearing non-redundant cycles seems
to be a reasonable idea. There can be many definitions of redundancy. Here we say a cycle
is redundant if it nests multiple shorter cycles and every agent in the cycle is involved in one
of the shorter cycles. Otherwise, we say the cycle is non-redundant.
To obtain a mechanism, we need to specify how much of objects is traded in every non-
redundant cycle. In every cycle the maximum amount of objects that can be traded is equal
to the smallest remaining endowment (the smallest weight of the edges o→ i) in the cycle.18
However, if multiple cycles share an edge o→ i, we need to divide the weight of o→ i among
the multiple cycles. How to choose the division is related to fairness.
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
1 1/4 1/2 1/4 0 0
2 0 1/2 0 1/2 0
3 0 0 1/4 1/2 1/4
4 3/4 0 0 0 1/4
5 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
Table 4: Assignment found by the first idea
Yet even without choosing the division rule, we are already able to use the first idea to
solve Example 1. In Figure 1, only cycle 5 is redundant; cycle 3 and cycle 4 only share
the edge 4 → o1. So we can trade objects as much as possible in every cycle. We trade
the amount 1/2 in cycle 1, the amount 1/2 in cycle 2, the amount 1/4 in cycle 3, and the
amount 1/2 in cycle 4. So 1 obtains 1/4o3, 2 obtains 1/2o4, 3 obtains 1/2o4, 4 obtains 3/4o1,
and 5 obtains 1/2o3. This finishes the first step of the mechanism. The following steps are
straightforward because only self-cycles (i → o → i) appear. In particular, at step two, 3
obtains 1/4o3; at step three, 1 obtains 1/4o1 and 5 obtains 1/2o5; at step four, 1 and 2 each
18We do consider agents’ demands because their remaining endowments are no greater than their remaining
demands.
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obtain 1/2o2, and 3 and 4 each obtain 1/4o5. The found assignment is shown in Table 4. It
is sd-efficient but violates EENE. Agents 1, 2 have equal endowments, but 1’s lottery does
not weakly stochastically dominate 2’s lottery for 1’s preferences.
E.2 Clearing all cycles equally
Given the failure of selecting cycles in the first idea, the second idea is to clear all cycles
simultaneously. The difficulty is how to do so in a feasible and fair way. We choose to treat
all cycles equally by trading an equal amount of objects in all cycles. At each step d, for
every edge o → i in the generated graph, we count the number of cycles that involve the
edge and denote it by no→i(d). Since the weight of the edge is ωio(d − 1), at most
ωio(d−1)
no→i(d)
of objects can be traded in each of the no→i(d) cycles. So we define the trading quota of all
cycles at step d to be
min
o→i: no→i(d)>0
ωio(d− 1)
no→i(d)
.
This mechanism seems to be fair. If an edge o → i is involved in multiple cycles, i
trades an equal amount of o in each of the multiple cycles. It also allows agents of different
endowments to obtain different benefits from their endowments. If an agent’s endowment
is demanded by more others, he is involved in more cycles and thus obtains more of his
favorite object. However, this mechanism is undesirable. If we run it in Example 1, at step
one the trading quota of all cycles is 1/4. So 1 obtains 1/2o3, 2 obtains 1/4o4, 3 obtains
1/2o4, 4 obtains 3/4o1, and 5 obtains 1/4o3. The following steps are straightforward because
only self-cycles appear. At step two, 3 obtains 1/4o3 and 5 obtains 1/4o3; at step three, 2
obtains 1/4o1 and 5 obtains 1/2o5; at step four, 1 and 2 each obtain 1/2o2, and 3 and 4
each obtain 1/4o5. The found assignment is shown in Table 5. It is sd-efficient but violates
EENE. Agents 1, 2 have equal endowments, but 2’s lottery does not weakly stochastically
dominate 1’s lottery for 2’s preferences.
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
1 0 1/2 1/2 0 0
2 1/4 1/2 0 1/4 0
3 0 0 0 3/4 1/4
4 3/4 0 0 0 1/4
5 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
Table 5: Assignment found by the second idea
A3
E.3 Decomposing agents
The third idea is to mimic Kesten (2009) to decompose every agent into multiple pseudo-
agents and let pseudo-agents trades endowments on behalf of real agents. Specifically, every
i is decomposed into pseudo-agents {io}o∈O such that every io holds i’s endowment of o. The
benefit of this idea is that in the generated graph, every pseudo-agent is pointed by only one
object and points to only one object. So the graph seems to be simplified. However, some
reflection should convince the reader that this simplification is illusory. In the generated
graph an object may point to several pseudo-agents and every pseudo-agent may be involved
in several cycles, which is same as before. If we use the former two ideas to solve Example
1, we obtain same assignments as before.
Aziz (2015) has used this idea to extend TTC to the FEE model.19 To solve the difficulty
we have discussed, Aziz uses exogenous rankings of agents to select cycles. At each step d,
let I ′(d− 1) = {i ∈ I(d− 1) : ωioi(d) > 0} be the set of agents whose remaining endowments
contain their favorite objects. If I ′(d−1) is nonempty, his mechanism lets every i ∈ I ′(d−1)
obtain his endowment of oi(d) immediately. Otherwise, an exogenous ranking determines an
agent that each remaining object should point to. We describe his mechanism as a member
of FTTC, and denote it by T a. T a uses the following λa(d) and βa(d):
• If I ′(d− 1) 6= ∅, for all i ∈ I ′(d− 1),
λai,oi(d)(d) =
ωi,oi(d)(d− 1)∑
j∈I′(d−1):oj (d)=oi(d)
ωj,oi(d)(d− 1)
,
βai,oi(d)(d) = ωi,oi(d)(d− 1).
For all i ∈ I ′(d− 1) and all o ∈ O(d− 1)\{oi(d)}, and all i ∈ I(d− 1)\I
′(d− 1) and all
o ∈ O(d− 1),
λai,o(d) is arbitrary and β
a
i,o(d) = 0.
• If I ′(d − 1) = ∅, let ⋗ be an exogenous ranking of agents. For all i ∈ I(d− 1) and all
o ∈ O(d− 1),
λai,o(d) =

1 if i = arg⋗-max{j ∈ I(d− 1) : ωj,o(d− 1) > 0},0 otherwise,
βai,o(d) = ωi,o(d− 1).
19Aziz considers weak preferences. For simplicity, we only discuss his mechanism under strict preferences.
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T a is undesirable in fairness. It violates ETE. In Example 3 of the paper, suppose both
2 and 3 own 1/4b whereas 4 owns 1/4c. If 2 is ranked highest in the exogenous ranking, then
at step one, b only points to 2. So 2 and 4 form a cycle. By trading endowments, 2 obtains
1/4c and 4 obtains 1/4b. At step two, 3 obtains his endowment 1/4b. So 3 envies 2.
Aziz proves that T a always finds a weak core assignment. Through the following example
we show that this statement is incorrect.
Example 6. Consider four agents {1, 2, 3, 4} and four objects {o1, o2, o3, o4}. Suppose T
a
uses the exogenous ranking 4 ⋗ 3 ⋗ 2 ⋗ 1. Table 6 shows agents’ endowments and prefer-
ences, and the assignment found by T a. The assignment is strongly blocked by {1, 3} through
exchanging their endowments.
o1 o2 o3 o4
1 1/2 0 1/2 0
2 1/2 0 1/2 0
3 0 1/2 0 1/2
4 0 1/2 0 1/2
(a) Endowments
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4
o2 o1 o1 o1
o1 o2 o2 o2
o4 o4 o3 o4
o3 o3 o4 o3
(b) Preferences
o1 o2 o3 o4
1 0 1/2 1/2 0
2 1/2 0 0 1/2
3 0 1/2 1/2 0
4 1/2 0 0 1/2
(c) Assignment
Table 6
Aziz’s mistake is due to an incorrect lemma stating that a weak core assignment in the
decomposed problem is also a weak core assignment in the original problem. This lemma
is incorrect because the blocking incentive of an agent in the original problem is not equal
to the “sum” of the blocking incentives of its pseudo-agents in the decomposed problem. In
Example 6, T a finds a weak core assignment in the decomposed problem: the pseudo-agent
1o1 does not want to form a blocking coalition with the pseudo-agent 3o2 , and the pseudo-
agent 3o4 does not want to form a blocking coalition with the pseudo-agent 1o3 . But in the
original problem, 1 and 3 want to block the assignment by exchanging their endowments.
F Extension of T e to HET
The extension of T e to HET is first proposed by Zhang (2017) and denoted by PSE. We
first present Zhang’s definition that describes PSE as an extension of PS and TTC. We then
explain that PSE coincides with the extension of T e to HET when HET is described by a
coarse priority structure as stated in the paper.
A5
In HET, we denote the set of existing tenants by IE and the set of their private endow-
ments by OE. Let π : IE → OE be a bijection such that π(i) is the private endowment of
i ∈ IE . Let O¯ = O ∪OE denote the set of all objects. After each step d of PS
E, let I(d) be
the set of remaining agents, O¯(d) the set of remaining objects, ri(d) the remaining demand
of each i ∈ I(d), and ro(d) the remaining amount of each o ∈ O¯(d).
The PSE algorithm
• Initialization: I(0) = I, O¯(0) = O ∪OE, and ra(0) = 1 for all a ∈ I(0)∪O(0). Set the
clock t = 0.
• Step d ≥ 1: Let every i ∈ I(d − 1) point to his favorite object oi(d) among O¯(d − 1).
Let every o ∈ O¯(d− 1) ∩ OE point to its owner π
−1(o) if π−1(o) ∈ I(d− 1).
– If there are cycles among existing tenants, let I(c) and H(c) be the set of agents
and the set of objects involved in each cycle c. The agents in each cycle trade the
amount min{ra(d−1)}a∈I(c)∪H(c) of private endowments instantly. Remove agents
whose demands are satisfied and objects that are exhausted. If the remaining
agents I(d) or the remaining objects O¯(d) become empty, stop; otherwise, go to
step d+ 1.
– If there are no cycles, let agents simultaneously consume their favorite objects
with rates (denoted by si(d)) that satisfy the “you request my house - I get your
rate” rule. For all i ∈ I(d − 1)\IE, si(d) = 1; for all j ∈ I(d − 1) ∩ IE , sj(d) =
sπ(j)(d) + 1 where sπ(j)(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1):oi(d)=π(j)
si(d). This step stops when some
agent’s demand is satisfied or some object is exhausted. If I(d) or O¯(d) become
empty, stop; otherwise, go to step d+ 1.
As said, HET can be described by a coarse priority in which social endowments O give all
agents equal priority, and every private endowment o ∈ OE gives its owner highest priority
and the other agents equal priority. In the extension of T e, let I(d), O¯(d), and oi(d) be
defined as above. Let OE(d) = {o ∈ OE : π
−1(o) ∈ I(d)} be the set of private endowments
whose owners remain in the procedure after step d. Then at each step d of the extension of
T e, agents trade endowments according to the maximum solution x∗(d) to the equations

xo(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1):oi(d)=o
xi(d) for all o ∈ O¯(d− 1),
xi(d) =
∑
o∈O¯(d−1)\OE(d−1)
xo(d)
|I(d− 1)|
for all i ∈ I(d− 1)\IE ,
xj(d) =
∑
o∈O¯(d−1)\OE(d−1)
xo(d)
|I(d− 1)|
+ xπ(j)(d) for all j ∈ I(d− 1) ∩ IE .
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subject to the constraints
xo(d) ≤ 1−
∑d−1
k=1 x
∗
o(k) for all o ∈ O¯(d− 1),
xi(d) ≤ 1−
∑d−1
k=1 x
∗
i (k) for all i ∈ I(d− 1).
To prove that PSE coincides with the extension of T e, we prove that agents’ consumption
at each step d of PSE is exactly the maximum solution x∗(d) at step d of T e. At each step
d of PSE, if there are cycles among existing tenants, for each existing tenant j involved
in a cycle, it is obvious that xj(d) = xπ(j)(d), whereas for each agent i and each object
o not involved in any cycle, xi(d) = xo(d) = 0. So x(d) satisfies the above equations
and constraints. If there are no cycles, let t(d) be the duration of step d. Then for any
o ∈ O¯(d − 1), xo(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1):oi(d)=o
xi(d), which holds by definition. For any i ∈ I(d −
1)\IE, xi(d) = si(d)t(d) = t(d), whereas for any j ∈ I(d − 1) ∩ IE, xj(d) = sj(d)t(d) =∑
i∈I(d−1):oi(d)=π(j)
si(d)t(d) + t(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1):oi(d)=π(j)
xi(d) + t(d) = xπ(j)(d) + t(d). We say
an agent i is linked to an object o if there exist distinct existing tenants j1, j2, . . . , jℓ such
that i points to π(j1), j1 points to π(j2), j2 points to π(j3), . . . , jℓ points to o. Because there
are no cycles, every remaining agent must be linked to some object in O¯(d− 1)\OE(d− 1).
Then the “you request my house - I get your rate” rule implies that the total rates of the
agents who consume O¯(d − 1)\OE(d − 1) is equal to the number of remaining agents. So
t(d) =
∑
o∈O¯(d−1)\OE(d−1)
xo(d)/|I(d − 1)|. It means that agents’ consumption at step d of
PSE still satisfies the above equations and constraints. Since at each step of PSE agents
trade endowments or consume objects as much as possible until some agent is satisfied or
some object is exhausted, PSE coincides with the extension of T e step by step.
A7
